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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1568

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LT GEN AVN BATEKHIN ON TRAINING RESULTS, TASKS

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 1-3

[Article by Lt Gen Avn L. Batekhin, member of the military council and chief of the Air Force Political Directorate: "By the Leninist Course"]

[Text] The Soviet people are greeting the 63d anniversary of Great October with new successes in communist construction and by great achievements in the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress. Our remarkable victories in economic, scientific, technical and cultural development are the living embodiment of Lenin's plans and the true triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia was a major event in world history. The immortal feat of the workers in our country who under the leadership of the Bolshevik party headed by V. I. Lenin overthrew the power of the exploiters and were able to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat knows no equal. Great October marked the beginning to the freeing of mankind from an exploiting system, it had a profound revolutionizing impact on the entire course of world history, and became the triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

Having emerged victorious in the Civil War and having repelled the imperialist intervention, Soviet power carried out the most profound socioeconomic changes. The industrialization of the nation, the formation of cooperatives in agriculture, and the cultural revolution were historical links in a grandiose chain of changes carried out under the Leninist plan for building a socialist society.

In carrying out a peace-loving foreign policy from the very first days of the formation of the Soviet state, the Communist Party has shown unflagging concern for the defense of the victories of Great October. In all stages of socialist and communist construction, the Soviet Armed Forces have been armed with the most advanced military equipment and weapons.

The treacherous attack by Nazi Germany interrupted the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. This was the largest armed action by the strike forces of imperialism against socialism, and one of the severest trials which our motherland has ever experienced. The Soviet people, like a single man, rose to the defense of the great victories of October. Under the slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!" they rallied more closely around the Communist Party which undertook enormous-scale political and organizational activities.

Along with the other armed services, our Air Force played an enormous role in the achieving of the historic victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism. In the struggle against the enemies of the motherland, the Soviet flyers showed unprecedented examples of courage, unstinting bravery and high combat valor, and they inscribed vivid pages in the heroic chronicle of the Great Patriotic War.

The victory won by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over fascism strengthened the international position of the USSR, and opened up new favorable opportunities for the further growth of the forces of socialism, national liberation, democracy and universal peace. The fruits of our victory in the Great Patriotic War are alive in today's international activities. In recent years, our nation has moved far ahead in all areas of socioeconomic and political life. There has been a strengthening in the alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia, as well as in the friendship of the Soviet nations and nationalities. The sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society has grown stronger, with the working class acting as the leading force. Having carried out the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet state has become a state of all the people. In our nation a new social community, the Soviet people, has arisen, and a developed socialist society has been built in which the creative forces of the new system and the advantages of the socialist way of life become evermore apparent, and the workers more and more benefit from the fruits of the great revolutionary victories.

The Soviet people ardently and with their entire heart accepted the decision of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to convene the 26th CPSU Congress. With enormous excitement, all the Soviet people greeted the clear and profound report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and the decisions approved by the plenum. The workers of the cities and villages and the men of the Armed Forces unanimously approved the domestic and foreign policy of the Leninist party and the Soviet state, and the diverse activities of the CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, to carry out the decisions of the 25th Party Congress. They are fully determined to greet the pending party congress with new labor achievements, and to do everything to make a new contribution to the cause of the further flourishing of the great socialist motherland.

Our society, a society of developed socialism, has convincingly demonstrated its inexhaustible possibilities and its creative strength. Guided by the Communist Party, the Soviet people have created powerful economic and defense potential, and modern science and culture. This has opened up favorable opportunities for solving every newer and more complex tasks of communist construction. The material and technical base of communism is being created, social relationships are being improved, the material and spiritual standard of living is rising, and socialist democracy is broadening and growing deeper. Further proof of this is the announcement of the USSR TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] on the results of carrying out the USSR State Plan for Economic and Social Development in the first half of 1980, the concluding year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.

The decisions of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the preparations getting underway in the nation for the 26th Party Congress have been a powerful lever for further increasing the political and labor activeness of the masses. "A maximum of energy, and this aspect must be emphasized," said Comrade

L. I. Brezhnev in the report at the plenum, "must be made to successfully fulfill and overfulfill the plan for the final year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, to promptly complete the nearly finished projects, and to ensure the dependable operation of the national economy in 1981, the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan." The report defined the key questions for the development of our economy, having particularly pointed out such a major task as increasing production efficiency and work quality. It pointed to the necessity of further accelerating scientific and technical progress, strengthening labor and state discipline, and providing steady growth of labor productivity.

The inspired, creative labor of the Soviet people further strengthens the economic and defense might of our motherland, and this is the basis for effectively carrying out the peace-loving foreign policy of the party and the Soviet government. As a result of the active and diverse activities of the CPSU and the nations of the socialist commonwealth, an improvement in the international climate was achieved.

These positive changes have encountered fierce resistance from the imperialist reaction. The ruling circles of the NATO countries, and above all the United States, are endeavoring to check the objective process of change in the world, and are carrying out a policy of strengthening the arms race, disrupting the military equilibrium existing on the international scene in their favor, and at instigating provocations against the socialist and independent countries. On an anti-Soviet basis which is hostile to the cause of peace, the aggressive circles in the West, and primarily in the United States, are drawing closer to the Chinese leadership.

Two political courses are presently determining world policy. The policy of strengthening peace and the peaceful resolution of unsolved problems as carried out by the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries, and the policy of neocolonialism, the intensification of international tension, of "Cold War" and aggression, as carried out by the United States and the other imperialist states. As in the first postwar years, the United States is again resorting to nuclear blackmail. The so-called "new nuclear strategy" which was recently adopted by Washington heightens the danger of an all-out nuclear conflict, and leads to a further escalation of the arms race. It has caused profound alarm among the world community.

The foreign policy of our nation, emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech at a ceremony in Alma-Ata devoted to the 60th anniversary of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Communist Party, is a clear and honest policy of peace and is not aimed against any third party. We do not encroach on anyone's land and do not intervene in anyone's internal affairs. But we are always able to stand up for our rights and legitimate interests.

Our valous Armed Forces possess everything necessary to rebuff any aggressor. We have a strong fraternity in arms with the national armies of the countries in the socialist commonwealth.

The high praise given to the Soviet Armed Forces by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech in Kazakhstan was received with enormous excitement by the military aviators, as by all the men of the Army and Navy. The socialist competition which is developing in the aviation units and subunits and the military schools to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress is a powerful lever in achieving high goals in military

skills. "An Outstanding Result for Each Precongress Day, and a 'Excellent' for Each Flight Shift!" This motto has spread widely among the flyers.

The personnel of the aviation regiment under the command of Col G. Treznyuk is greeting the holiday of Great October with high results in military and political training. This collective has been the initiator of the socialist competition in the Air Force at the beginning of the training year, and assumed the obligation of winning the title of outstanding. And the flyers have kept their word.

Each day of combat training for the Soviet pilots is a visible affirmation of the succession of glorious combat traditions of the Air Force. Mass heroism, ardent love for the motherland, loyalty to the oath and colors, military comradeship and mutual aid--these and many other glorious traditions of the combat veterans at present comprise a sound foundation for the high combat readiness of the flyers.

For the Air Force this training year has been full of tactical flight exercises, rocket launches, practice bombing, and intense flights. The flyers have worked under a difficult tactical and meteorological situation, during the day and at night, they have carried out diverse combat training missions, and have learned to be victorious over a strong, technically well equipped enemy. To learn what is needed in war and to seek out ways for even more effectively mastering the new aviation equipment and weapons are constant demands on the combat training of the aviators and giving it purposefulness, concreteness and great intensity.

By the end of the second training period, among the military aviators there was a significant rise in the number of outstanding men in military and political training, class specialists, sniper pilots and sniper navigators, and experts in the combat employment of aviation equipment and weapons. New outstanding units and subunits appeared in the Air Force, and they successfully carried out their socialist obligations and the military and political training plans. High indicators in training were achieved by the units and subunits where the commanders and political workers were officers P. Vetrovoy, I. Kuz'menko, Ya. Arbachakov, and others. The successes in the military service of the leading troop collectives can be explained primarily by the able organizational and political indoctrination work done by the commanders and political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations, as well as by the vanguard role of the communists in training and service. The ability to constantly conduct individual indoctrination with the men and unit the military collectives has assumed great importance. At the basis of all the successes lies the constant and unswerving exactingness of the commanders combined with paternal concern for subordinates, as well as effective and active party political work.

The report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee clearly and thoroughly formulated the basic tasks which confront the party organizations on the occasion of the preparations for the next congress. These tasks encompass all aspects of political, organizational and ideological work. The preparations for the highest forum of the party should become a powerful lever for increasing the political and professional activeness of both the communists and nonparty persons.

In these days, each communist aviator feels particular responsibility for the fact that he is an ideological fighter of the party. He must devote all the verve of his heart and all the inspiration of his soul to the high duty of mobilizing the

men for shock labor in honor of the approaching congress. And the main subjects of his speeches should be the leading role of the party in communist construction, in strengthening the defense might of the state and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, in the struggle for peace and international cooperation, the achievements of the Soviet people in economic, scientific and cultural development. The precongress themes should be vividly taken up in lectures and reports, in special-subject evening meetings, in the course of conducting the unified political days and in many other mass political measures. Particularly important is the participation of the command and political leadership, our finest propaganda forces, in the propaganda and agitation work.

The tasks related to the shaping of a communist ideology hold one of the central places in the party's activities. The 25th CPSU Congress clearly outlined the basic areas of ideological work at the present stage and the ways for increasing its ideological level and effectiveness. In carrying out the congress decisions, the CPSU Central Committee has promulgated a number of important decrees on the questions of communist indoctriation. Of truly program importance is the Decree "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" approved in April of last year. On the basis of the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee, the speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and his books "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], and "Tselina" [Virgin Land], the commanders, political bodies and party organizations of the aviation units and subunits and military schools have done and are doing a great deal to improve ideological indoctrination and raise its effectiveness.

At the recently held conference of the command and political leadership of the Army and Navy, in a report on the course of carrying out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee to further strengthen the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces, the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Gen Army A. A. Yepishev, pointed out that the growing scope of communist construction, the qualitative changes occurring in the Army and Navy personnel, the complexity and contradictoriness of the international situation, the particular importance of maintaining constant combat readiness, and the exacerbation of the ideological struggle on the world scene have constantly increased the demands on indoctrination in the Armed Forces. Their role as schools for the indoctrination of soldier patriots and soldier internationalists is determined by the sociopolitical nature, by the high social importance, by the technical equipping and skill level of military service, by the integrated nature of party political work aimed at developing a scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology and an activist position in life in the servicemen.

The military councils, the commanders and the political bodies are endeavoring to thoroughly and profoundly study the questions occurring in the life of the military collectives. This helps in correctly determining the ways for increasing the level and effectiveness of indoctrination for the personnel. More attention has begun to be paid to long-range and current planning and to coordinating the various elements of ideological work. The party influence has also been strengthened on improving the quality of the basic forms of political study and at increasing the activeness of agitation-propaganda and cultural education work.

In being concerned with increasing the effectiveness and quality of indoctrination, the Communist Party has demanded first of all high moral and political qualities

and a personal example set in carrying out military duty on the part of the leadership, and all command, political and engineer-technical personnel. It is essential that the military exactingness of an officer for his subordinates be reinforced by a personal example of the flawless execution of service duties, and by an enterprising, creative approach to the job.

The broad propagandizing of the party's policy and effective organizational party work should become an effective means for raising the political, service and labor activities of the communists and nonparty persons. The military councils, the commanders, the political bodies, the staffs and the party organizations must thoroughly analyze the results achieved in military and political training in light of the tenets of the 25th Party Congress, and in the socialist competition, and on this basis outline specific measures for political and organizational activities in the forthcoming period. Basic efforts must,be focused on the complete and high-quality execution of the tasks posed for the Air Force during this training year, and on creating the appropriate conditions for the organized entry into the new training year, the start of which occurs during the time of the most active preparations for the congress.

During this period it is important to increase the activities of the party organizations, intensify their influence on all aspects of the training and life of the military aviators, and direct the initiative of the Komsomol organizations at developing among the young soldiers a struggle to master the equipment and weapons, to most strictly observe the requirements of the flight documents, and to carry out the obligations assumed in honor of the congress. There must be active participation by the Air Force Komsomol organizations in the All-Union relay of combat deeds of Komsomol members and the youth to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress.

The period of preparations for the congress coincides with the holding of reports and elections in the party organizations. As was pointed out at the plenum, the report and election campaign on the eve of the congress is a special time in the life of the party, a time of the greatest responsibility. It is important to conduct this campaign on a worthy level, in accord with the views stated in the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, to disclose unutilized reserves and opportunities, and determine the ways for realizing them. At the party meetings and conferences, measures must be outlined to further improve all aspects of party work, political, organizational and ideological, in the interests of increasing combat readiness, improving the quality of combat and political training, and strengthening military discipline in the aviation units and subunits.

The military aviators, in approaching the 26th CPSU Congress, are fully determined to successfully carry out the tasks resting on them. In greeting the national holiday of the 63d anniversary of Great October, the winged defenders of the fatherland, loyal to the ideals of October, are reporting to the glorious Communist Party that they are fully determined in the future to strengthen and add to the combat might of the Air Force, and to vigilantly guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people and the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

The preparations for the congress are developing into a new vivid demonstration of the indivisible unity of the party and people. The Soviet people are expressing wholehearted love for their tested vanguard, the Communist Party, and their readiness to steadily follow behind the party in its Leninist course to new heights in communist construction.

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COOPERATION NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE COMMAND DECISIONS

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 4-6

[Article by Lt Gen Avn P. Masalitin, USSR Honored Military Pilot: "According to a Unified Plan"]

[Text] Modern combat is characterized by the high maneuverability of equipment, by the high combat might of the equipment, by a rapid change in the situation and, as a rule, by a shortage of time which directly influences the taking of a decision by a commander and its implementation. All of this requires the coordinated actions of the ground and cooperating air subunits in the interests of achieving the objective outlined by the command.

Cooperation must be developed in the course of daily combat training. The knowledge and skills acquired here are reinforced and honed in the tactical flight exercises and in joint exercises with the ground subunits. The experience of such exercises convinces us that success unfailingly comes to that side where the means and methods of continuous control have been thought out, where uninterrupted communications have been provided, and cooperation better organized.

Of course, the presence of an air representative at an observation post or command post of a commander who is directing combat helps in directly utilizing the aircraft groups in the necessary sector, and when necessary to carry out an in-air retargeting. But the greatest effect in employing them is achieved after the joint training of representatives from the air and ground subunits, and the familiarizing of them with the fire and maneuvering capabilities of the combat equipment of either side, the methods of identification, target designation and much else which inevitably arises in conducting modern combat.

At present no one would any longer doubt that a reciprocal enriching of the knowledge of tactical principles and the mastery of the art of precise cooperation and control have become major conditions which determine the outcome of combat. For this reason, the honing of practically tested procedures and methods for supporting ground subunits and the constant search for new ones, and the prompt transmitting of mutual information are a major task of the commanders, staffs and political workers.

Great experience in supporting ground subunits has been gained in the helicopter squadron where Military Pilot 1st Class Capt V. Zubchenko, serves. The commander of the military district has repeatedly commended the aviators for skillful and

enterprising actions and for intelligently carrying out the tasks given for the exercise. However, when the helicopter pilots began to work on cooperation with the ground subunits, difficulcies suddenly arose.

For example, prior to the "Neman" Exercise, the squadron was working on the attacking of ground targets. In one of the sectors, the ground subunits had broken through the "enemy" defenses. According to the development, the tanks and motorized rifle troops rushed into the breech. Seemingly the success of the offensive was preordained. However, the opposing side put up stubborn resistance. An acute need arose for air support for the attackers.

The helicopter subunit under the command of Capt V. Zubchenko took off to carry out the mission. In covertly approaching the area of combat operations, the commander was unable to immediately get his bearings in the terrain and did not detect the target without halting. The "enemy" had skillfully used camouflage gear. The subunit was threatened with hits by air defense weapons. Moreover, the commander did not recognize the target and attempted to attack his own tank column. Only the intervention by the combat control officer prevented a mistake by the pilots.

A detailed analysis of the operations of the helicopter group showed that Capt Zubchenko and the crew commanders had not sufficiently studied the dynamics of combined-arms combat or the nature of its development. For this reason they were unable to quickly and clearly understand the ground situation.

On the basis of the analysis made, in the subunit a range of measures was worked out, planned and implemented aimed at further improving the air and tactical skills of the flight personnel under the conditions of cooperation with the Ground Forces.

There were interesting exercises on the subjects: "Principles of Modern Combined-Arms Combat" and "Ensuring Safety of Cooperation Between Ground and Air Subunits." Subsequently, meetings were organized between the commander of the air subunit and the crews with the commanders of the tank and motorized rifle subunits, the particular features for the tactical actions of the latter were worked out on an offensive, on the defensive, during a march and in a meeting engagement, and the procedures of target designation and mutual recognition were studied. In turn the aviators told about the capabilities of helicopter gunships and the tactical procedures and features of an attack on various targets.

The next stage in the exercises was to be training for the flight personnel in reconnoitering the terrain in the area of forthcoming actions, as well as exercises to organize cooperation using a terrain mockup. Of course, all of this took time. As the further training flights indicated, the personnel began to get their bearings much better, to identify the objects of attack without error, to attack the small-sized targets quickly and accurately, and skillfully use natural features for masking the flight. The airmen learned how to clearly imagine the routes of their troops and the lines for their deployment into battle formations.

In the course of the preparations for the exercise, shortcomings were also detected in the adjacent squadron under the command of Military Pilot 1st Class, Maj Yu. Robul. For example, in reaching the target, individual groups of the various types of helicopters did not maintain the time intervals due to the inaccurate calculating of the time for commencing the maneuver. This could entail a disruption of

flight safety conditions. For this reason, the crews did not provide the main thing, continuous fire affect against the objective of the attack.

Considering the shortcomings, the squadrons organized additional exercises on ground force tactics, and on studying the area of the flights from the map and on the terrain. The squadron commanders and the flight leaders carefully calculated and checked the time and direction for the reaching of the target by each group. And only having made certain that the flight personnel understood the mission confronting them did the commanders consider the flight preparations complete.

Finally the day came for which everyone had been preparing steadily and constantly. The "Neman" Exercises had commenced. During the day and at night the crews carried out various assignments, and in each flight the airmen demonstrated their best qualities. The aviation was used both by the attackers and the defenders. Thus, the commander of one of the sides, having analyzed the situation, decided to begin a breakthrough of the "enemy" defenses. For this in the selected sector, he created a superiority of men and equipment. The helicopters were to neutralize the newly detected firing positions and tanks.

The fighters, according to the plan of the command, were to cover the attackers against "enemy" aviation. Specifically this mission was entrusted to two groups which were headed by the deputy squadron commander, Military Pilot 1st Class Maj B. Divitskiy, and Military Pilot 2d Class, Sr Lt D. Chichuk. Having received the mission, the pilots began their preparations.

Reconnaissance reported that the defending side was preparing a counterattack. For this reason the forces of the opposing aviation, its capability and the assumed nature of combat operations were carefully studied. As the basis they assumed that the "enemy," in going over to aggressive operations, would scarcely decide upon a straight ramming thrust. Such a decision would inevitably lead to severe losses for it. Consequently, the natural conclusion was that the opposite side would endeavor by some routine procedures to confuse the opposite side, and catch it unaware. The pilots and the combat control officers were aware that the "enemy" would inevitably endeavor to use surprise.

The question arose of how it could achieve this. Here the officers used the tested method of imagining themselves in the place of the attackers. And their suppositions were based upon the possibility of the massed use of electronic countermeasures, the rational organization of the battle formations and the use of favorable flight altitudes.

Officers Divitskiy and Chichuk, in realizing that they could not carry out the given mission without clear contact with the command post and the air defense troops, worked out the signals and procedures for cooperation with them.

Nevertheless, the officers, naturally, could not count on the "enemy" resorting to one of the envisaged plans without fail. And what were their decisions?

Divitskiy, considering the possibility of the penetration of the "enemy" through the air defenses at a low altitude and high speed, proposed breaking up the battle formation of the group to a distance of the visual range. This provided for the viewing of a larger sector of space using the onboard radars. Then he determined

the signals for maneuvering and played through the maneuvers with the flyers. The flyers were given a certain independence in detecting the "enemy," and attacking it. Moreover, the major provided a possibility for the simultaneous committing of the entire group to battle.

Sr Lt D. Chichuk did not agree with such an organization of the combat formation. He felt that even the temporary breaking up of the group would lead to a weakening of its fire capabilities and would impede control of it in the event that the "enemy" used jamming on the communications channels. For this reason, in his opinion, the flyers would pay more attention to observing the aircraft of the leader than in conducting a search. Chichuk even proposed that it would also be disadvantageous for the opposing group to spread out its formations in depth, as this inevitably would lead to an increase in the time they were exposed to air defense weapons.

As we see, both commanders based their arguments on weighty and convincing grounds. Practice was to show whose decision was the most correct.

With the start of combat operations, the situation became sharply intensified. The "enemy," as was assumed, used communications and radar jamming, and thus to some degree was able to disrupt the preciseness of command over the subunits. The air defense troops also had a difficult time. In this situation the role of the in-air commander increased sharply.

Maj Divitskiy brought his group into the search area and soon detected the "enemy," with two fighters traveling at a medium altitude. He ordered Capt A. Dmitriyev to attack the enemy with a two-plane element, and the other were to intensify the search. The "enemy," in refusing combat, turned 180° and began to pull back under the protection of its own air defense weapons. At this time one of the pilots detected a large group of aircraft at a low altitude. Immediately Divitskiy decided to attack the "enemy" with all the forces of the group.

Capt Dmitriyev was given the command to break off pursuit, to return to the search area, to intensify observation and be ready to cover attacking comrades. The bold attack of the fighters stunned the "enemy," and its plan was thwarted. At the same time the pilots saw a powerful chain of explosions behind the front line. The artillery had gone into action.

The situation developed differently for Sr Lt Chichuk. Having taken the decoy group as the basic attack forces, he attacked it. But the "enemy," having detected the interceptors, spread out and, in maneuvering energetically, took cover in the clouds, it used jamming, and retired under the protection of its own air defense fire. But Chichuk was imprecise in assigning the targets to the following elements, and was not successful even with an extended pursuit.

The "enemy" immediately benefited from this and fell on the ground subunits which were already moving into the breach. The enemy counterattack was thwarted only by the efforts of the reserve groups and also the air defense troops.

The opposing side stiffened its resistance, and threw the reserves into combat for the purpose of eliminating the breakthrough. For this reason the helicopter gunships were called in. But this time the groups of V. Zubchenko, Yu. Robul and

others successfully carried out the mission. The helicopter troops showed high piloting techniques, accuracy and the ability to excellently find their way on the terrain. And the fighter aviation, having won full air supremacy in this sector, provided a dependable cover for the ground forces and its aviation.

The "Neman" Exercise again affirmed that initiative in combat is in the hands of decisive, active commanders. And these qualities must be indoctrinated, formed and tempered in each day of combat training. And the pitch of training has particularly intensified now, when the Soviet people and the armed protectors of the victories of Great October are preparing to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress.

The experience of the "Neman" Exercise is a foundation for achieving new successes in developing cooperation among the aviation and ground subunits.

One of the most effective forms for training commanders in the art of cooperation, as experience shows, are periodic training courses for them. And although the organizing of such measures does have its problems, nevertheless a very high result is achieved. Certainly in the courses the commanders acquire not only knowledge, but also become acquainted with those with whom they will cooperate in combat and for whom they will provide air fire support. This circumstance strengthens military comradeship and indoctrinates a feeling of fellowship. In addition, the commanders gain confidence in the correctness of their actions and this is reinforced in the course of exercises.

The command, the staff and the political bodies of the district aviation pay the most serious attention to these questions, in focusing the commanders and political workers on struggling against weaknesses and omissions in indoctrination. Also under constant supervision is the teaching of cooperation between the air subunits and the subunits of the other troops, and the improving of the control system. And this is quite understandable as only close contact develops a combat spirit, teamwork, mutual understanding and military comradeship--the qualities essential for servicemen in carrying out the high duty of defending the socialist victories and the inviolability of the frontiers of our beautiful motherland.

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PILOT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 6-7

[Article by Military Pilot 1st Class, Guards Maj V. Voronin: "And Both Knew About This..."]

[Text] Each year the aviation regiments receive young pilots. In school they have acquired profound theoretical knowledge and the skills of piloting modern supersonic aircraft. But it is still too early to speak about the readiness of the recent graduates to conduct combat operations. The command and the political workers are confronted with the serious task of turning them into highly skilled and tactically adept air fighters in a short period of time.

As is known, the nature of modern combat has sharply increased the demands on the combat skill, physical condition, and moral-political and psychological qualities of military aviators. The high speed, the great acceleration and rapidly changing air situation demand from the flight personnel instantaneous responses, efficient thinking, and bold and decisive actions in the developing situation. These qualities are produced in the course of flights and during moral-political and psychological training.

Several young pilots arrived in our squadron. The subunit collective had prepared ahead of time for this event. The personal files of the officers had been studied, and they had been previously assigned to the flights and instructors were appointed. But, as is known, the descriptions in the personal file give only sketchy information about a man. For this reason, the squadron commander Guards Lt Col B. Romanchikov, started the work with the new men with thorough individual talks. And considering the particular characters of the young officers and the level of their professional training, the commander finally assigned the instructors. The development of beginning pilots depends largely upon the pedagogical talent, the skill and the authority of the flight leaders and the direct superiors of the young officers, and upon their ability to promptly spot a mistake and suggest the correct way for rapidly eliminating it. An experienced mentor is not only a commander but also a senior comrade who is ready to give a hand at any moment.

The flight leader, Military Pilot 1st Class, Guards Maj R. Irinarkhov, has great authority among his subordinates. And with good reason the collective led by him for many years has firmly kept the title of outstanding. Party principledness and a commander's exactingness are combined in his character with daily concern for the men.

After ground training and the passing of exams, the pilots in the flight of Guards Maj Irinarkhov began to fly. Everything was going well but suddenly there were two potential flight accidents one after the other. Lts A. Kutuzov and N. Kondakov had landed the fighters roughly. An analysis of the materials of the SOK [?monitoring equipment] showed that before touching down on the runway the pilots had moved the engine control lever from the SPS [expansion unknown] stop.

"But both knew that the instructions prohibited this," thought the flight leader, "but what is the reason? A lack of discipline? If so, they must be strictly punished, but if not?..."

The reason for the potential accident was found. In training in the aircraft cockpit, Irinarkhov discovered that both the young flyers, in operating the engine control level, fingered the catches of the SPS. Prior to landing, in reducing speed, they involuntarily squeezed the catch, the engine control lever was released from the stop, and the SPS shut off.

It turned out that the pilots had learned this procedure of actions at school. And the developed stereotype had led to undesirable consequences, as the SPS had been disconnected on the aircraft at the school.

After an analysis of the potential accidents, training was carried out with all the young flyers, and there were no more such mistakes.

Instilling confidence in the dependability of the operated equipment is one of the important aspects in forming the high moral and psychological qualities of combat airmen. On this level extensive work with the young men is carried out by the deputy squadron commander for IAS [aviation engineer service], and member of the party bureau, Guards Capt V. Romanov. Visibly, understandably, and using examples from the experience of servicing aviation equipment, he tells about possible deviations in the work of systems and units, he explains the physical sense of one or another phenomenon, and gives advice of what attention should be paid to in carrying out flight missions. The basic objective of these talks and exercises is to convince the pilots that the reliability of the equipment depends upon its skillful operation and profound technical knowledge.

Instruction using examples from flight experience is a very effective method. With good reason in aviation the rule has taken root of "do like I do." And this is followed by the squadron officers.

It was noticed that at the beginning of flight activities, the pilots at times found it difficult to overcome the psychological barrier which arose because of major mistakes in piloting techniques. At times this for an extended time put them out of the pace of flying. In such a situation it was very important to have a correct approach to the aviator who is just beginning to develop his flight skills.

Once Guards Lt A. Goncharov landed an aircraft short of the runway. The potential accident was analyzed, the reasons for the mistake were explained to the pilot, an additional check-out flight on a two-man trainer was given, but independently Goncharov should land at an increased speed and sometimes far down the runway.

The squadron commander, Guards Lt Col Yu. Radovichenko, realized that the flyer had lost confidence in his forces. He repeatedly spoke with Aleksandr [Goncharov], and

the latter admitted that after the unsuccessful landing he could not force himself to bring the aircraft at a normal speed to the point of beginning to level out. It seemed to him that the aircraft again was "striking" the ground before the runway. The commander spent a good deal of energy to reinforce the pilot's confidence in himself and overcome the psychological barrier. And he succeeded. At present Goncharov flies evenly and confidently and is successfully advancing through the training program for a class rating.

In the indoctrination of subordinates an important role is played by the commander's concern for the domestic conditions of the young officers. As experience shows, the organization of daily routine and leisure can have a definite influence on the professional development of military flyers. Let me give an example.

Guards Lt A. Arestov arrived in the unit without a family and initially lived in the medical quarters. He was one of the first to successfully fly a combat aircraft and began to master the difficult types of training. But after some time the pilot ceased to please the commanders. The problem was that his wife had arrived and the young family moved into the hospital, where the conditions for preflight rest were bad. Arestov arrived for flights irritated and at times depressed. He began to make mistakes in piloting techniques and then potential air accidents.

Such a change immediately alerted the squadron commander. Having discovered the reason for the pilot's failures, he sought the advice of the squadron communists. The collective decided to help the young officer. They soon found housing and helped Arestov settle in. At the same time the commander did not overlook his flight training and constantly helped him. Such concern and attention required a response from the young pilot. He became more demanding on himself, he quickly caught up with his comrades, and is now successfully mastering the nighttime training program.

Demonstration flights over the airfield are of great significance in improving the moral-political qualities and in raising the psychological mood. Unfortunately, they have been used rather rarely recently in our unit.

Of course, the development of the young flyers does not occur without mistakes, but they would be much fewer if the ground training of the pilots were carried out in a thoughtful and sound manner. The developing of high moral-political and psychological qualities in flight personnel is a complicated process. It is no accident that great attention is paid to this, since the success of carrying out any flight mission ultimately depends upon the moral-political state of the pilot and his psychological mood.

The complexity of the international situation demands high professional skills from us. The high quality execution of the flights without any flight accidents or potential accidents will be a worthy contribution by the military aviators of our unit to the preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress.

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USE OF ANALOGIES IN COMBAT DECISION MAKING

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 8-10

[Article by Col Ye. Tomilin: "What Should be Taken from Combat Experience"]

[Text] In everyday life, people generally explain an unknown or new phenomenon by using a comparison, in drawing an analogy with known facts, phenomena and processes, and making the required conclusions for themselves. The use of analogies has always been a widespread logical procedure in decision taking by a pilot in a combat situation. One would clearly sin against the truth if one said that after receiving a combat mission a pilot immediately began to invent an original way for carrying it out. Usually, in relying on his knowledge and experience, he would seek out in the "treasure chest" of the past a similar phenomenon and use it as an approximate model of forthcoming actions.

The well-known book "Idea, Algorithm, Decision"* has the following to say: "The rather widely held notion that each decision taken by a commander should be creative and based on the uniqueness of details of military situations is false at its very basis. A person never falls into two completely identical situations. But does this mean that any action is the result of a creative decision? In no way. Moreover, too great a diversity in a situation does not contribute to creativity, as it does not ensure the acquiring of information on the properties of the situations whereby a qualitative leap could be taken in understanding their nature. Unfortunately, the tendency to hang any conscious and particularly enterprising action under the heading of creativity is extremely widespread and has serious negative consequences in the underestimation of experience, knowledge and skills."

Combat experience is acquired in a war. But 35 years have already passed since the end of the Great Patriotic War, and several generations of combat aircraft have followed one another. Is this experience out of date? Can it be of benefit to a pilot now in carrying out complex tactical missions?

Let us endeavor to answer these questions by examples without forgetting the main thing: a) the relationship of the model to the modeled object is not a relationship of identify but rather analogy; b) analogy is not a proof.

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*V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kontorov, "Ideya, Algoritm, Recheniye" [Idea, Algorithm, Decision], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1972, p 45.

As an example, let us take a situation typical for today in a tactical flight exercise. A squadron is to attack an "enemy" airfield covered by air defense weapons. The airfield mock-up has been laid out on the firing range, the situation at it (the positioning of the objects) is known from reconnaissance data secured the day before. In accord with the mission, they are to destroy as many "enemy" aircraft as possible, and this is to be achieved with minimum losses for themselves from the firing of air defense weapons and high combat effectiveness.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, combat experience was generalized, studied and used in the air armies. Reports were compiled, and recommendations worked out on carrying out the most difficult combat missions. Let us become acquainted with recommendations given in a report of the commander of the 2d Air Army concerning the organization of strikes against enemy airfields.

"1. Strikes against airfields are successful only when they are backed up with reliable reconnaissance data and are carried out under conditions of surprise.

2. Repeated strikes against the same airfields, without updated reconnaissance data, upon personal intuition (that there should be aircraft at the airfields) and without careful preparations of the sortie, are absurd, and they lead to high, completely unjustified losses in equipment and personnel.

3. Strikes against airfields with small air groups are ineffective, they do not ensure the complete destruction of all the enemy equipment, but are more like individual handclaps used for the effect of frightening and not for complete destruction.

4. In raids against airfields, up to one-third of the forces must be assigned to neutralize the enemy antiaircraft positions for ensuring freedom of actions for the ground attack group. Neutralization can be achieved under the condition of good reconnaissance data about the target. There must be a bolder approach to the question of organizing in the air the combating of the ground antiaircraft defense system of the objective.

5. Experience has shown that the aircraft at an enemy airfield can be completely destroyed only by a massed attack on one of them. The order of forces for the strike should proceed from a figure of 1:1 (that is, there should be for every enemy aircraft one of one's own)."

A study of other documents which generalize the experience of attacking enemy airfields makes it possible to derive the basic methods for countering air defenses. These included: the driving of the cover fighters from the area where the strike was to be made; fire neutralization of the antiaircraft artillery and the carrying out of anti-AA maneuvers. The driving out and neutralization were carried out by specially assigned groups which could not participate in the attack. The anti-AA maneuver was executed by the bombers themselves. Here the following recommendations were followed by the pilots.

The best avoidance procedure was considered to be a quick retreat into the clouds, and for this reason the presence of cloudiness with sufficiently good visibility beneath it favored the carrying out of the mission. When it was necessary to make the flight beneath the clouds, it was dangerous to keep directly at their lower

level, since the enemy antiaircraft artillery was aimed for this altitude ahead of time. It was best to remain with a "clearance" of 200-300 m or fly even lower in order to be able to maneuver in the horizontal and vertical.

In clear weather, the passes at the target were made predominantly out of the sun as this blinded the crews of the antiaircraft batteries. Also effective were strikes by small bomber groups at dusk, when the ground reference points were still sufficiently visible, but it was difficult to locate the aircraft from the ground.

For the purposes of deceiving the enemy, the last segment of the route was sometimes shifted to another important objective, and then a sharp turn was executed, and the attack was made from the least expected direction. Here a heading maneuver was combined with an altitude maneuver. If high-density all-round antiaircraft fire was expected, then the bomber groups crossed it almost simultaneously from different directions, obtaining a gain in time. Here the crux was surprise. In the course of a "star" raid, the aircraft were stacked without fail. In accord with a different variation of the breakthrough, the groups assigned to neutralize the antiaircraft artillery by firing created a corridor to the target for the bomber attack group. The latter reformed into a column which entered the corridor with a minimal time interval. The battle formation which was extended in depth was maintained until the line was reached for the separating off of the flights, each to its own target.

The sector with the least air defense resistance was ascertained by reconnaissance ahead of time. Consideration was also given to zones closed off to antiaircraft fire and formed by terrain elevations, and these were plotted on the pilot flight charts. The approach to the target in this sector was executed "in a fan," that is, by converging bombing runs which initially differed one from the other up to 15°. Before beginning the dive, the flight reformed into an echelon which was inverse to the direction to the target. The dispersion of antiaircraft fire, the increased density of the strike ultimately reduced the vulnerability of the bombers.

In organizing a raid by our aviation on the Uman' airfield of 24 January 1944, provision was made to first damage the runway and to seal off the adjacent airfield at Khristonovka where enemy fighters were based.

The first blockading group consisting of eight Pe-2 and escorted by six La-5 approached the Uman' airfield from the west at an altitude of 3,300 m. Having glided to an altitude of 2,700 m with stopped-down motors and spread out by flights, the bombers dropped a portion of the bombs on the airfield. Having descended to 1,900 m, they made a second run and fired on the antiaircraft emplacements with machine gun fire. As a result of the raid with delayed-action bombs, the airfield was put out of service, two aircraft were hit, one hangar set afire and a gasoline storage area blown up.

The second group consisting of six Pe-2 escorted by five La-5 from a horizontal flight at an altitude of 2,700 m dropped high explosive and smoke bombs on the runway of Khristanovka airfield. As a result the airfield was clouded in smoke, and the active part of the field was put out of use. The enemy fighters based at Khristanovka could not sortie to repel the raid by our bombers on Uman' airfield.

The documents have preserved for us a description of strikes against airfields which could be taken as a model or "base decision," and considering corrections for the specific situation and the altered combat capabilities of the equipment, used in working out a plan for forthcoming actions in exercises.

In the informational issues of the Air Force from the times of the Great Patriotic War in the section "The Fight for Air Supremacy," we will find a description of a strike against the Idritsa airfield made by units of the 15th Air Army on 27 February 1944. Let us give the most important details from it.

The air situation. On 26 February 1944, air reconnaissance had photographed the Idritsa airfield and spotted up to 90 Nazi aircraft, including up to 65 J-87 bombers. The airfield was covered by forces of up to 11 antiaircraft artillery batteries which cooperated with the antiaircraft artillery at the railroad station, and up to 8 batteries for the city of Idritsa. From 1000 hours on 27 February 1944, the enemy, in taking off in groups of 18-24 J-87, began bombing the battle formations of our troops.

The plan. For winning air supremacy during the period of the concentrating of our troops and their going over to the offensive, the commander of the 15th Air Army decided: on 27 February 1944, in two waves, to attack the Idritsa airfield with the mission of destroying the enemy aircraft.

a) The first wave of six Il-2, immediate escort twelve Yak-9. Raid to be made by surprise.

b) Second wave of twelve Il-2, direct escort of ten Yak-7 and twelve La-5 for sealing off the airfield.

The strike was timed for when the enemy bombers were landing. It was to be hit with one pass with the complete expenditure of the battle scale of ammunition.

Fighters: basic mission to combat the enemy fighters in the air, and in the absence of them to help neutralize antiaircraft fire and destroy aircraft on the airfield.

The bombload of the ground attack planes--85 percent small fragmentation bombs and the remaining 15 percent the FAB-50 and FAB-50 md high explosive bombs.

Preparations for the operation. The Idritsa airfield was studied in detail by all the personnel using large-scale maps and photographs. The flight personnel knew not only the quantity of equipment, but also the positioning of it on the airfield, and the number of antiaircraft batteries. They realized that the most intensive antiaircraft fire would come from the southern and southeastern sides of the airfield, while to the east of the airfield there ran a high forested hill which made it possible to escape from the antiaircraft fire in a low-level flight.

Immediately before the flight, the personnel was given up to 2 hours of time for preparations (studying the last photographs, clarifying the questions of cooperation, and allocating the targets between the groups).

The strike against the airfield was made in two waves during the period of 1340-1400 hours. The routes were chosen far from roads and major population points across forested and lake areas.

The first wave approached the target from the southwest in tree-top flight, and began the attack from an altitude of 70 m, using the sun and the forest for concealment against the background of the terrain and for the surprise of the raid. The formation was a group of six in an extended front. The departure from the target area was over the forested hill.

The second wave made its run at the target from the north at an altitude of 1,200 m after a sharp turn to the left with a loss of altitude and anti-AA maneuver, and began bombing from an altitude of 400 m. The two groups of six ground-attack planes in each were in a right echelon.

Each of the crews independently chose its own target for bombing and firing, without losing its place in the overall combat formation. The antiaircraft fire was neutralized by the assigned crews in the sector of the approach of the ground attack planes. The blockading fighters covered the ground attack planes, circling over the airfield at an altitude from 1,000 to 2,000 m in three levels.

With the approach of the first group, the cover fighters engaged an enemy patrol (of six aircraft). The antiaircraft artillery was unable to open fire. The second wave was fired on from the ground and was attacked by a second group (of 8-10 aircraft) of enemy fighters approaching the airfield.

As a result of the strike on the airfield, 32 aircraft were destroyed and damaged, and six were shot down in air combat. Follow-up reconnaissance established 50 fires.

In the second half of the day, regardless of the improvement in the weather, not a single enemy bomber or scout appeared over our troops. The combat mission had been successfully carried out.

In accord with the procedure of applying the method of an historical analogy, it is now essential to make an analysis.

In the first place, let us draw attention to the fact that each crew attacked its own target on the airfield without loosing its place in the overall combat formation. Just such a principle made it possible for the eighteen Il-2 ground-attack planes, with the aid of a portion of the fighters covering them, to destroy 32 enemy aircraft on the ground in a single pass. Also of important significance here was the choice of the bombload which was basically made up of small fragmentation bombs.

Secondly, attacks with individual aiming in a group raid were planned only with up-to-date reconnaissance data. In the process of preparing for the flight, photographs and large-scale maps were used making it possible to determine a rational formation and plan for the bombing runs. A simultaneous straight-in attack by the groups of six ground-attack planes was ensured by their formation in an extended front, where each two-plane element acquired relative freedom of maneuvering on the bombing run.

Thirdly, for the purpose of achieving high combat effectiveness, the time of the strike was not rigid, but rather was timed to the moment of the landing of enemy bombers at the airfield. This made it possible to catch the largest number of exposed targets on the ground. Moreover, the bombers which were landing or taxiing on the airfield impeded the taking off of enemy fighters to repel the raid.

Fourthly, a most important role was played by the surprise factor. Due to the unexpected appearance of the first group of ground-attack planes over the airfield, the enemy was unable to promptly undertake active defensive measures and prepare to repel the attack. Six ground-attack planes carried out the attack without encountering resistance. And as is known, in such instances bombing precision is significantly increased. Surprise was achieved by a group flight which was hidden from enemy observation at a maximum low altitude, and this required high skill from the flight personnel, particularly in maintaining the extended combat formation. Moreover, prior to the first attack, actions were not carried out to neutralize the antiaircraft artillery so as not to alert the airfield air defense system ahead of time. Obviously, with the large number of forces involved in the raid, it would have been more difficult to achieve tactical surprise.

Fifthly, proper attention should be paid to the maintaining of one's own invulnerability (or "survivability" in modern terminology). The routes of the waves passed over forested terrain far from roads and population points where there was the least probability of being fired on from the ground. Maximum use was made of the blind sectors in the zone of fire which were formed by the terrain elevations. The approaches to the target were selected considering the least probability of the hiting of the aircraft by the airfield air defense.

The documents of the Great Patriotic War show a diversity of tactics and an originality of variations in attacking enemy airfields. The directive of the commander of the Red Army Air Force of 29 June 1943 mentions the "coaxing out" strategem which was subsequently widely used: "In order to guarantee the greatest surprise for our ground-attack planes and bombers, it is advisable to send out a strong group of fighters with a small group of ground-attack planes one hour or one hour and ten minutes beforehand. The ground-attack planes should simulate an attack on the airfield while the fighters should attack the enemy fighters or at least force them to use up fuel and land at the airfields at the very time that our ground-attack planes and bombers will appear over the target with a strong fighter cover."

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CREW PSYCHOLOGY DISCUSSED

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[Article by Military Sniper Pilot, Lt Col G. Krasovskiy, and Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lt Col V. Kutuzov: "Contact in the Crew"]

[Text] The effectiveness of carrying out any flight mission, particularly one under extreme conditions, depends largely upon the psychological attitude of the crew members, their teamwork and solidarity. Once, a crew consisting of the pilot, Capt A. Burshtyn, and the navigator, Sr Lt A. Balin, in carrying out an over-water flight, got into a difficult situation. The aviators acted precisely and as a team, emerging with honor from the situation which developed and safely concluded the flight.

Sometime thereafter, Sr Lt A. Balin was assigned to another position, and Lt V. Grishin became a member of the crew. Initially everything went well. But then in one of the en-route flights, a basic flight instrument failed. The navigator was unable to completely carry out his duties. As a result of the uncoordinated actions, as was shown by the recording of the KZA [monitoring-recording equipment] and an analysis of the flight, the pilot in the clouds was flying with a large bank, and permitted a loss of altitude and the bringing of the aircraft into a shaking mode. Fortunately, everything ended safely.

What do these examples show? The first shows the high psychological compatibility of the crew members, and the second the lack of coordination in their actions as a consequence of the fact that the psyche of both crew members had not yet gone through the stage of adaptation. The pilot and the navigator had not sufficiently studied the professional and psychological qualities of each other, and were unable to anticipate how they would act under difficult conditions.

This happens not only in crews where young officers are serving, but also with completely mature pilots. Let us give some examples. In a unit a crew was made up of high-class specialists with great flying experience. However, a close-knit and sound collective did not result. The pilot, Lt Col A. Smirnov, was constantly dissatisfied with the actions and behavior of the navigator, Maj V. Pavlov, not only in the air but also on the ground. And the navigator responded over-sensitively to the comments by the pilot. Both became hostile, and this told negatively on the quality of the flights as the level of carrying out the missions often was low.

In order to find out the reasons for this, the command listened in to the radio traffic of the crew during the exercises. The exchanges had a nervous nature. The

crew commander who had a clearly expressed choleric temperament was suspicious of the navigator's actions, he rushed him without any particular need, and frequently requested the flight parameters. The slow, phlegmatic navigator was unable to do the additional calculations, he was late in replying and finally lost control of himself. Thus, a psychological incompatibility arose caused by the difference in the complex psychological qualities of these men.

These examples indicate that psychological contact between crew members has a substantial influence on their joint activities. In the unit unflagging attention is given to making up close-knit crews capable of carrying out any mission under the most difficult conditions. Thus, the crews are made up considering the personality and mental features of the pilots and navigators. In the process of military and political training the commanders, political workers and the party and Komsomol activists instill in them high moral-political, military professional and psychological qualities.

The unit command makes up the crews after studying the qualities of each aviator using the documents received from the place of previous service, considering the opinion of the party and Komsomol activists and relying on personal observations of the activities and conduct of the pilots and navigators. But, as practice has shown, such selection is not always successful.

At present, the problem of the scientifically based making up of the crews can be settled by using the homeostatic procedure, testing and determining the level of leadership and communicativeness. Before selecting the crew, the unit studies the subjective characteristics of the crew members and their joint activities. Without fail a study is made of political preparedness, the moral make-up, the level of professional knowledge, abilities and skills, communicativeness, the ability to understand people and to work with them, discretion, objectivity, the ability to analyze and take decisions, energeticness and self-discipline, social relationships, equinimity of character, and so forth.

In the activities of the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations a central place is held by developing high moral-combat qualities in the flight crew members. Here the main thing is a specific impact on the mind of the aviators considering their individual traits. Without this it is impossible to achieve high effectiveness in joint activities. K. Ushinskiy has written that if pedagogics wishes to train a person in all regards, it should first of all know the person in all regards: "The educator should endeavor to know a person, how he is in reality, with all his weaknesses and all his greatness, with all his every-day minor concerns and with all his great spiritual needs. He must know the motivating causes of the most base and noblest deeds, the history of the genesis of criminal and great thoughts, the history of the development of each passion and each character."

In studying the personality traits of aviators, experienced commanders and political workers using biographical information endeavor to disclose the moral and political qualities which would describe the level of their political awareness. Here it is very important to understand the bent, ideals and interests of each person, his inclinations, the quality of memory and attention, volitional traits, temperament, state of health and physical development. In addition, it is essential to know how a pilot or navigator relates to his profession and service as a whole, the nature of his relationships in the subunit, with whom he is friendly, and what are his

material and spiritual needs. In a sincere and unforced conversation it is possible to gain a certain notion of a man.

However, a person can be one thing in words but another in deeds. For this reason, a comparison of word and deed and an analysis of daily conduct are an essential condition for studying people. V. I. Lenin emphasized that the most valid criterion for judging a person is his daily, concrete deeds. That is, the important thing is not what a person says but rather what he does.

A daily study of the aviators and a critical assessment of their deeds require that the commanders and political workers not leave a single infraction by a subordinate without establishing the motives which caused him to carry out this action.

Officer A. Selyavko in the subunit was known as a quarrelsome man. And he had also committed unseemly deeds. Such behavior also was reflected in the successes of the collective. The commander and the party organization profoundly studied the individual qualities of the officer, and began to help him constantly develop positive character traits. The sensitive and attentive attitude on the part of the chiefs and comrades, mutual understanding in his family, and flights in a crew with the secretary of the unit party committee helped Capt Selyavko. He began to critically view his misdeeds, and changed his attitude toward service. Now he is a leading pilot, he has great respect in the collective, he works constantly on improving his political and professional knowledge, he has mastered flying, and takes an active part in the social life of the subunit.

Experience has shown that the character of the young pilots and navigators arriving from the schools is still in the development stage. In order that the young officers become true masters of their job and are shaped into a close-knit collective capable of carrying out difficult missions, painstaking and serious political indoctrination is required. This provides the greatest effect when the specific party-political measures are combined with individual indoctrination. This makes it possible to monitor the consecutive implementation of the indoctrination program, to avoid monotony in the use of pedagogical and methodological procedures, and to better mobilize and utilize the party and Komsomol aktiv in the indoctrination of the men.

Indoctrination is a difficult matter. It is even more difficult to reindoctrinate. Experience suggests a certain sequence for this process. Having thoroughly studied the individual qualities of a subordinate, particularly the negative ones, a leader determines the tasks in the area of reindoctrination. The disclosure of negative qualities makes it possible to outline the most effective methods and forms of work. Those good qualities which have been sufficiently developed in the subordinate are systematized. They comprise the basis in the indoctrination work. Finally, the qualities are determined which must be developed after eliminating the negative ones. And, of course, one must select the most effective and concrete method of work in each individual instance.

A profound and thorough study of the personnel, consistency and purposefulness in indoctrination help the leader know each pilot and navigator, to make up efficient crews, to strengthen friendship and comradely closeness in them, and to avoid the factors and conditions which give rise to conflicts in military collectives.

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UNITY OF WORD, DEED IN COMPETITION DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Maj Gen Avn A. Singayevskiy: "When Word and Deed are United..."]

[Text] The Soviet people and our Armed Forces are preparing to greet the 26th CPSU Congress with new successes. By shock labor, and by the broad scope of the socialist competition, the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, the people's intelligentsia and the Soviet military express their wholehearted dedication to the cause of communism and their strong, indistructible unity with the Communist Party. As the tested political leader of the Soviet people, our party, on a profoundly scientific basis, has clearly defined the strategic and tactical tasks, and has ably found the effective ways and means for carrying them out. The source of the effectiveness of party leadership and the guarantee for our successes lies in the ability not only to work out the program or policy and to determine the ways for carrying out specific tasks, but also to implement them in practice.

A unity of word and deed is an indelible trait of the Leninist style of work, and a most important condition for the successful application of revolutionary theory in practice. The party has always viewed the word or given promise as a firm obligation. It has moved decisively against irresponsible assertions, and has ensured the unity of its slogans and practical work, the program tasks and organizational activities. For the Leninist party, said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the word does not diverge from the deed. The course of the victory of the socialist revolution, the course of socialism and the course of building communism--this is the party's word as expressed in its three programs. The victory of October, the triumph of socialism, and successful advancement along the path to the communist tomorrow--this is the deed of the party, the deed of the entire people.

The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" with particular force emphasized the need of ensuring a unity of word and deed as a most important trait in the Leninist style of work, and a fundamental principle of communist indoctrination. Precisely such an approach ultimately provides for the turning of Marxist-Leninist ideas into the personal convictions of each Soviet person, into an alloy of knowledge, communist conviction and active practical involvement in the building of a new society.

The completeness of realizing the unity of word and deed in practice depends upon the level of party leadership, and the strength of such leadership consists in the fusion and inseparable dialectical relationship of the impassioned, convinced communist word and the concrete, practical deed.

Precisely such a creative approach to the pending tasks, efficiency and professionalism, the all-round consideration and use of advanced experience, critical analysis of the achieved, a desire to carry things out to the end, and an inseparable unity of word and deed characterize the work of a majority of the party committees and primary party organizations in the aviation of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District.

In the district aviation units intense combat training is underway. In using its favorable opportunities, the military aviators are constantly improving combat skills, they are steadily mastering modern weapons and equipment, and are struggling stubbornly to carry out their obligations in the precongress socialist competition under the motto of "Sacredly Carry Out Lenin's Legacy, Improve Combat and Political Training, Increase Vigilance, and Always be Ready to Defend the Motherland and the Great Victories of Socialism."

High indicators in military and political training have been achieved by the men of the leading units where officers G. Shchitov, A. Vasil'yev, A. Vakulenko and others serve. The successes of these military collectives are based primarily on the fact that in them the communists set the tone in everything. They are marked by firm ideological tempering, high professional competence, discipline and efficiency, a heightened sense of party and service duty, and loyalty to the unity of word and deed. Here they decisively prevent the slightest weaknesses in training or formalism in carrying out indoctrinational measures. Each party and Komsomol activists sets the example in training, service and discipline, and in carrying out the socialist obligations.

Moving confidently in the ranks of the outstanding is the leading squadron under the command of the Military Sniper Pilot, Guards Lt Col A. Bokach. The squadron communists skillfully determine the most important crucial problems in combat training, by their word and personal example they raise the men to successfully carry out the most difficult tasks. Thus, in fully realizing that the level of the combat skills of the men depends largely upon the class rating of the personnel, the communists in the squadron have come forward with the initiative that during this training year the aviators will raise their class rating by one level.

The regimental party committee and the political section of the formation have supported this initiative. In all the subunits, a struggle has been developed to increase combat mastery and technical knowledge. By concrete deeds the communists are ensuring the carrying out of these tasks.

First of all, the personnel themselves built good training facilities with working models and diagrams. The party organization has shown constant concern for the independent study of the flight and engineer-technical personnel. For each specialist, specific assignments have been worked out for studying aviation equipment considering the particular features of the performed functional duties. In each subunit, technical circles have been set up and they are led by engineers and experienced technicians. Upon the initiative of the communists, they hold technical conferences,

demonstration exercises on the aviation equipment, competitions for the best mechanic according to the various specialties, as well as exercises in the military-technical lecture series. The oral and visual agitation specifically tells about the leaders in the competition for high technical knowledge, as well as about the best pilots, technicians and aviation mechanics.

Here the socialist competition is widely used for the tasks and standards and for an excellent result of each flight and each flight shift. In the squadron and regiment the socialist competition has spread widely for the right to carry out a flight in such a manner that it is entered in the flight book of Hero of the Soviet Union B. Obraztsov who is carried in perpetuity on the rolls of the regiment's personnel.

Great attention is given to individual work with all categories of personnel, and particularly with the pilots. When Guards Capts V. Shiryayev and V. Shilin were to attack for the first time small-sized targets at night under a difficult tactical air situation, the subunit commander, communist A. Bokach, made several training flights on a two-man trainer with the pilots. He practically prepared the pilots for this complicated test and helped them gain confidence. The squadron party bureau has established constant control over the carrying out of the accepted decisions and personal assignments in strict accord with the Leninist belief that the essence of control is to provide a unity of decision and execution, to prevent possible mistakes and shortcomings, and to be able to promptly correct them.

Initiative, tenacity, and principledness on the part of the communists, and the desire to ensure a unity of word and deed have caused the successful carrying out of all the tasks confronting the subunit. The squadron rightly holds a leading place in the regiment. The missions of the tactical flight exercise were carried out with an evaluation of excellent and over 80 percent of the pilots are first and second class.

The significance of the struggle for flight safety and for ensuring the unswerving observance of the documents regulating flight training is well known. The unit party committee of which Maj N. Ishchuk is a member carries out extensive party political work aimed at indoctrinating the aviators in a spirit of strictly observing the laws of flight service, and exercises a differentiated approach to the problem of flight safety. Great attention is given here to a thorough study, explanation and propagandizing of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and the Air Force military council on the questions of flight safety.

The party committee regularly brings up for broad discussion by the communists the questions of carrying out the requirements of the documents which regulate flight safety, and of raising the personal responsibility of the communist leaders, the flight and engineer-technical personnel for the high quality execution of flight preparations, for the maintenance and operation of aviation equipment.

A characteristic trait in the activities of the party committee is the fact that it shows constant concern for indoctrinating the leading cadres, for raising their skills, and for ensuring their example in flight and combat training. An absolute majority of the subunit and crew commanders are outstanding men in military and political training and high-class specialists.

The plans of the party committee and the party organization secretaries for each specific flight shift provide for such measures as work with the party and Komsomol aktiv, the providing of help to the commanders in organizing and carrying out the socialist competition for the tasks and standards considering the nature of the flight missions to be carried out, and the generalizing and propagandizing of advanced experience. The unit party organization sets an example in the unity of word and deed in carrying out party decisions. Here for many years there have been no flight mishaps. The political section for the aviation of the district has generalized the advanced experience of the party organization in this regiment, and has recommended that it be used in all other flight units and subunits.

Certainly it would be an error to assert that a strong fusion of word and deed is inherent to absolutely all our party organizations and troop collectives. Sometimes instead of business-like decisions, the party organizations approve documents which abound in general appeals.

In practice it also happens that in one or another subunit at first glance everything seems fine and the stipulated measures are being carried out regularly. However, with a more profound analysis, it turns out that the effectiveness of this work is low, since the collective year after year, as they say, is marking time.

It once happened that the personnel of the air unit where Officer N. Kirichenko was serving had begun to surrender its positions. Previously it had high indicators. In the course of a detailed study of the activities of the commanders and the state of party political work, it became clear that individual leaders lacked the ability to provide a unity of word and deed, and to reinforce the good appeals with precise organizational work. Insufficient attention was paid to the indoctrination of subordinates. The officers of the political section, from the combat training section, the staff, and the aviation engineer service of the district aviation provided help to the unit leaders in organizing flying, in servicing the aviation equipment and in the political and military indoctrination of the aviators. At recently held exercises, the personnel carried out complex missions involving the actual use of the entire weapons complex and the crossing of the "enemy" air defense system with an evaluation of "excellent."

In speaking about the unity of word and deed, it is essential to mention that at times leaders are still encountered who under the pretext of creativity and innovation come forward with various initiatives and undertakings. Initially they stir up intense activities, they hold meetings, they write out slogans, but when you ask what is the return from this undertaking, it turns out that they have forgotten about the initiatives and there has been no actual result. In the unit where Officer A. Ocheret is serving, at the beginning of the training year there were numerous talks about organizing a competition among the personnel for savings and thriftiness. Much was said, but they forgot about the practical aspect of the matter.

In observing the unity of word and deed, like in carrying out all the tasks which should ensure a high level of military and political training, military discipline, organization and order in the troops, units and subunits, an important role is played by the leading personnel. Life places ever new and constantly growing demands upon the military personnel of all levels, and particularly on the leading workers. A modern leader, as was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, should organically combine party dedication with profound competence, discipline with

initiative and a creative approach to the job. At the same time, in any area a leader must also consider the sociopolitical and indoctrinational aspects, be sensitive to people, to their needs and requests, and serve as an example in work and everyday life. Without observing these demands it is virtually impossible to ensure a unity of word and deed.

"'Position' [dolzhnost'] and 'duty' [dolg] are words with a common root," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at a meeting with voters from the Baumanskiy Electoral District of Moscow. "We must always remember our duty to the people whether it is a party, official or human duty. Without the unswerving carrying out of this duty, without the ability to link word and deed by a strong drive belt, there is and can not be a true party and soviet worker."

A continuous rise in the effectiveness of party political work depends largely upon the creative approach and effectiveness of each measure carried out, upon the skillful use of the very rich arsenal of forms and methods for political, moral and military indoctrination, and upon a unity of word and deed. This is a sort of foundation for the aviators to successfully carry out the set tasks and assumed socialist obligations in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

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RESPONSIBILITY OF PROPAGANDIST DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 14-15

[Article by Maj V. Tutov: "The Responsibility of a Propandist"]

[Text] Extensive work has been started up in our unit to study the documents of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the materials of the 3d Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting. In giving lectures and reports, an in conducting planned exercises for political training and theoretical seminars, the non-T/O [volunteer] propagandists carry the undying ideas of Marxism-Leninism into the masses of military aviators, and clearly show the unceasing activities of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government to carry out the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the successes of the Soviet people achieved in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, and they explain the tasks of properly greeting the 26th CPSU Congress.

The agitation-propaganda collective which is directed by Officer N. Volodin has made a great contribution to the indoctrination of the troops. It includes the officers who are the best trained in theoretical and pedagogical terms and who have the earned respect of the aviators. In their majority they have high special and political training, and this makes it possible to differentiate their activities and to more fully consider the specific nature of the audience and the type of tasks to be carried out by the subunits.

Here each member of the collective is specialized in a certain area of propaganda, including: on the questions of the international situation, the party's domestic policy, the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, aviation-technical and legal knowledge, and so forth. The speeches of the members of the agitation and propaganda collective, Officers A. Shikanov, N. Volodin, A. Mukhin and I. Kramar, in being profound in content and vivid in form, always find a lively response in the hearts of the aviators. The success of these propagandists is based upon careful preparations for each meeting with the students and on the ability to give the material. As is known, people pay attention to not only what is said to them from a rostrum, but also how this is said. To whom do they listen with attention and respect? To a speaker whose impassioned words stir the listeners, arouse their thoughts, and engender a desire to act and show initiative.

Practice indicates that in order for the word of a propagandist to be weighty and effective, he must thoroughly know the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and possess broad erudition and sound military preparation. A speaker is popular and well

regarded when he fully masters party propaganda, and, as V. I. Lenin emphasized, is able to best influence the given audience, making for it a well-known truth as convincing as possible, as striking as possible and impressive. In this regard it is obvious how important it is for the propagandist to have a good knowledge of the audience before which he is speaking as well as the tasks being carried out by the given collective and the state of affairs in it.

I have often attended lectures and reports which were given by members of the agitation and propaganda collective discussed here. And each time I was convinced that the work of a majority of them is permeated by communist conviction, by high responsibility, and by an ardent interest in getting across their knowledge to the listeners.

In the unit there are many such propagandists. For example, Maj A. Terpelyuk endeavors to make his every speech interesting and not routine in form. In conversations with the men, he does not avoid difficult questions, he does not keep silent about shortcomings and difficulties, and is able to touch the hearts of his listeners with his confidence and convincing examples. This happens because he appeals to the aviators only with those thoughts and words which he has summoned up and passed through his own heart. Obviously it is about precisely such people that it is said that propaganda work has become a second calling for them.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" also mentions the necessity of increasing the effectiveness of the propaganda word. The decree points out that the frequently encountered formalism, an inclination for wordiness and all sorts of propaganda pat phrases and the constant repetition of well-known truths instead of their creative analysis and the search for vital and accessible forms are a major drawback which substantially reduces the effective impact of indoctrination on the awareness and feelings of people.

Recently I had occasion to attend a lecture given by one of the members of the agitation and propaganda collective. It dealt with the importance of military discipline. Everything in the speech was correct, but certain ideas were given distractedly, dryly, without any link to the life and tasks of the aviators. The speaker virtually did not take his eyes off the notebook and was unable to establish the essential contact with his audience. Obviously the speaker himself was primarily to blame for the fact that the lecture was no success. He did not make any particular effort to prepare for the speech, feeling that he would carry out his mission if he simply mouthed a previously prepared text. At a meeting of the party bureau, the activists dealt sharply with this communist for his negligent attitude toward the speech.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" emphasizes the necessity of conducting an irreconcilable struggle against indifference, laxness in ideological and political indoctrination, and to decisively root out whatever reduces the effectiveness of the party's influence on the minds and hearts of the men. In those collectives where this work is carried out in strict accord with today's requirements, it is marked by high effectiveness, by timeliness, and the propagandists show a feeling of responsibility for the results of their work.

Practice shows that the words of a propagandist are only effective when they are timely, fresh and interesting, when they force the listeners to reflect and draw the necessary conclusions for themselves. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his acceptance speech upon receiving the Lenin Prize, pointed out that it was essential to invade practical life, to help the people more clearly understand the purpose of this life and the direction of its current, and to help make this life better, more just and brighter, richer not only materially but also spiritually. What could be more important or nobler? The party approaches all forms of ideological work precisely from this standpoint.

Experience has shown that the activities of the non-T/O propagadists are effective when the unit command and political workers show constant concern for their ideological, theoretical and pedagogical training and for how they are informed. In this regard good experience has been gained in the unit where Officer V. Kravchuk serves. Here seminars, assemblies, and the exchange of experience are conducted systematically with the propagandists, and they are directly informed of major events and problems in the domestic and international life of the nation. The political workers provide effective control over the quality of the propaganda speeches. Moreover, in this unit they have set up well equipped studies for Marxist-Leninist and moral-psychological training, and these have the literature necessary to prepare for the speeches.

The regimental party organization pays great attention to the work of the agitation and propaganda collective. Following its recommendations, the propagandists have focused their efforts on work directly in the squadrons. This makes it possible for them to be in constant touch with the aviators, to more thoroughly study their needs, to respond more efficiently to the problems which arise in daily life, and to analyze them in greater detail. Here it has become a rule not only to discuss the contents of the prepared lectures, but also to mention the pedagogical skill, the style of the speeches of one or another propagandist, to acquaint him with the comments on the previous speech, and to see to it that none of the questions which arise among the listeners is left without a sound reply.

In this collective it has become a widespread practice to have the members of the agitation and propaganda collectives give reports at sessions of the party bureau on how they are improving their propaganda skills and increasing the effectiveness of the speeches. For example, recently at a session of the bureau the party activists rightly criticized the communists A. Shchukin and A. Myasnikov for omissions in preparing the lectures. They took the criticism correctly, and began to prepare for the speeches more carefully.

The party organization of the unit is endeavoring to make each communist propagandist view his work as a most important party assignment and to be profoundly aware of all the responsibility and all the political significance of the task entrusted to him, that is, to carry into the masses of soldiers the ideas of the Leninist party, and to instill in them vigilance, a sharp class feeling, intolerance of bourgeois ideology, and a readiness to wholeheartedly defend the motherland and the historic victories of socialism.

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COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 14-15

[Article by Military Pilot 2d Class, Guards Sr Lt N. In'kov, secretary of the Squadron Komsomol Bureau: "On the Forward Edge"]

[Text] The tactical flight exercise in the squadron where Military Pilot 1st Class, Lt Col P. Kaltashkin is the commander, started with the signal "Assemble!" At the airfield everything went into motion. The technicians and mechanics worked deftly beside the aircraft, and the flight ground support equipment moved up. And things were busy for the young aviation specialists. The Komsomol members, IAS [aviation engineer service] Officers A. Bastyuchenko, I. Tershukov and others worked energetically. In preparing for the tactical flight exercise, they had accepted increased socialist obligations, and had given their word to shorten the time required to bring the missile-carrying airplane to a state of combat readiness, while maintaining the excellent quality of their servicing. The actions of the specialists were confident and precise, and each second of working time was counted. Working next to them were the aviation mechanics Guards Pvts A. Mambetakhunov and G. Dideyev. They had less experience, but they compensated for this by precise and well thought out actions. And it was a victory. The norm was surpassed. The aircraft was ready ahead of time for the sortie.

By this time the pilots had received the combat training mission. Having quickly studied it, they took their places in the cockpits of the aircraft. The flight controller gave the order to start up to the two-plane combat element of Military Pilot 1st Class Guards Sr Lt A. Ponomarev. The secretary of the squadron party organization was taking off on a mission with his wingman, the member of the Komsomol bureau and Military Pilot 2d Class, Guards Sr Lt V. Bochkarev.

"This is not the first time that these communists are carrying out such flights," said one of the pilots watching the disappearing combat aircraft. "They are always ahead."

At a low altitude, having crossed the "enemy" air defense resistance with tactical skill, the pair of fighter bombers reached the target at the designated time. The strike was pinpoint. With the same skill, the pilots executed the antiflak maneuver, the breaking out of formation and the landing back at the airfield. The actions of the element were given a high grade.

On that day the motto of the competition "Each Bomb, Missile and Shell on Target" became the standard for the aviators of our squadron. In developing the success of the subunit, the targets were successfully attacked employing a difficult type of maneuver by the aviators from the outstanding flight commanded by the communist, Military Pilot 1st Class, Guards Capt Yu. Sushkin. His subordinates precisely maintained the flight formation and hit the target accurately.

...In the brief minutes between flights, the pilots surrounded the commander and the party bureau secretary. Here also were the technicians and junior aviation specialists. Guards Lt Col P. Kaltashkin analyzed the actions of the personnel in the first flights, he pointed to the outstanding men as an example and also indicated shortcomings.

The party and Komsomol activists listened to him attentively. Had the flight of Guards Capt Sushkin been noticed? Very good. The party bureau secretary immediately proposed that he share his bombing experience with the young aviators. Guards Sr Lt V. Bochkarev had much to do. The Komsomol leader found the time both for preparing for the next flight as well as for speaking with the aviators. The activists together with the members of the party bureau put out a combat leaflet and "express" devoted to the pacesetters of the socialist competition and prepared for the next issue of the radio news.

Such well thought out and precise party political work in the squadron has become possible due to the fact that the communists and Komsomol members, upon the advice of the deputy commander for political affairs, planned their actions ahead of time, and allocated the chores. The activists thought out how the successes of the collective could be brought to the attention of the aviators, and what questions must be concentrated on by the personnel. In the intervals between the flights, the activists told the Komsomol members and young servicemen about the feats of the veteran guardsmen and about those who spared no effort and life itself for carrying out their military duty.

The squadron fully carried out the posed combat training missions. The daily painstaking work by the commanders, the party and Komsomol organizations and all the personnel led to success. Here a major role was played by the professional training which had been well thought out and planned by the squadron commander. For instance take the tactical flight conferences where, as a rule, they analyze the questions of the effective employment of aircraft armament and the improving of piloting techniques. As experience has shown, to a great degree they influence the quality of combat training. For example, at a conference held soon after the tactical flight mentioned here, speeches were given by the 1st class pilots, communists P. Kaltashkin, V. Yakubovskiy, Yu. Antonov, and others. They told their comrades about the procedures of combat maneuvering in the target area, and about the methods of crossing the "enemy" air defenses, the conducting of air combat, and so forth.

The Komsomol members also made their contribution to raising the combat readiness of the subunit. The Komsomol bureau endeavored to find new useful forms of training. Among them were such as a competition for the title of best in profession, the exchanging of experience, and others. A good initiative was proposed by the squadron Komsomol bureau member, Guards Sr Lt Tech Serv Ye. Gredkovets. On the eve of intensive flights he proposed that technical contests be held on the subject "How Have I Mastered My Specialty?" This was of interest to the Komsomol members. Many of them became active participants and organizers of such contests.

The Lenin Exam has become a major help in the training and indoctrination of the young aviators. In the course of it the youth reported on the carrying out of the socialist obligations in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress, and shared their plans for the future. This made it possible to determine who was keeping his word and how, who was worthy of praise or needed help, and who must be sharply rebuked.

Once one of the Komsomol members left a foreign object at the aircraft parking area. This could have led to undesirable consequences. The Komsomol bureau members sought advice from the commander, the political worker, and the squadron party organization secretary on how they could better respond to this infraction. The opinion was unanimous, namely not to limit themselves to disciplinary measures, but to explain again to the personnel what negligence in flight support could lead to.

At the end of the work day, the Komsomol activists V. Bochkarev and Ye. Gredkovets assembled the aviators in the classroom. The conversation was business-like and principled. No one was left out.

The Komsomol members are involved in everything, they are always in the very thick of events, as they say, at the peak of the attack. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, from the rostrum of the 18th Komsomol Congress spoke precisely about this younger generation. His words resound as both a challenge and as an order to our aviators: "In the future let the pure fire of patriotism burn in your hearts, and let live the noble feeling of personal responsibility for the assigned job and for all that is occurring in the nation."

During the last training year, our squadron achieved significant successes in military and political training. For unstinting military service and for the successful carrying out of the socialist obligations in honor of the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin, the personnel was awarded the Lenin Diploma. At present the task of the Komsomol members is to critically assess what has been achieved, to generalize the positive experience acquired in the intense military activities, and, in using it in the broadly developing socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress, to raise the combat readiness of the squadron to a new, higher level.

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COMMANDERS' CONCERN PRODUCES GOOD TRAINING RESULTS

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 p 16

[Article by Military Pilot 1st Class, Maj F. Bagruzov: "The Results Are Where the Concern Is"]

[Text] That memorable meeting in our flight was being held in an active and business-like manner. And this is understandable as increased socialist obligations were being accepted to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress.

"We must maintain the title of outstanding flight," said the party organizer, Capt A. Shchelolev, at that time. "And we must not merely affirm the achieved results, but also take a significant step ahead in increasing combat readiness, mastering the equipment and weapons, and ensuring flight safety."

Practice shows that success in carrying out the obligations comes in the instance that each competitor approaches this important question in a creative manner, if he critically assesses his possibilities, and sets specific goals for himself. The efforts of the party and Komsomol groups were aimed precisely at this.

At that time, significant changes were occurring in the flight, and the collective was receiving new men. The school graduates, Lts V. Vasil'chanko and A. Skorikov had arrived to take up the positions of helicopter navigator pilots. Both young specialists had good training, and there was reason to assume that in the immediate future they would begin independent work. However, with the assuming of individual obligations by these comrades, they had to be cautioned against excessive hurry and presumption, and reminded that the word they had given should be reinforced by deeds.

The young communists were aided by the flight party organizer, Capt A. Shchegolev. He spoke with each of them, he established the level of their professional training, he was able to correctly determine the strong and weak points of their characters, and was able to find realistic obligations which were within their reach. At present, in summing up the results, it can be said that the selected method and all the work carried out during that time proved fully effective. Both officers made a great effort, and they were the first from the arriving graduates to be permitted to carry out flights along a route during the day under visual and instrument flight conditions.

The commanders and the party activists were constantly concerned for the growth of the young officers. And the results come where the concern is.

Each point of the socialist obligations was thoroughly thought out, completely sound and weighed. The approval of them in each crew was preceded by a careful discussion of the existing capabilities. Some, for example, being uncertain of their forces, decided not to assume additional burdens. Then the communists suggested: what is a competition for if nothing more is done above the established level. And if some planned something completely unattainable, then they were cautioned. The commanders, the party and Komsomol activists in each specific instance found the correct approach to the men. As a result of this work, in the zone there was not a single pilot, technician or junior aviation specialist who did not find an opportunity for further professional development and ideological-political growth.

From the very first days, the competition for leadership between the crews reached great intensity. The example was set by the party organizer and other communists from the flight. Thus, the crew of Capt A. Shchegolev challenged the strong rivals, the subordinates of Capt G. Delayan, to a competition. The tone was set by the commanders.

The results of the competition were given daily. This provided an opportunity to strictly monitor its course, to note shortcomings and quickly respond to them, to spot the new and rational and to adopt it. Consideration was given to the carrying out of the plan for flight training, combat employment and the state of military discipline.

The competition was particularly apparent in the course of the flights involving missile launches against ground targets. Their results quickly became known and were immediately analyzed. Out front was the crew of Capt A. Shchegolev. Why? The training methods of the rivals were the same, and the level of the pilots was also approximately equal. But it turned out that the excessive endeavor and hurry of Capt G. Delayan sometimes got in the way. At first glance this would seemingly be a minor detail, but it served as the reason why in one of the flights the crew did not work completely precisely.

The young officers did not lag behind their senior comrades. Both the commander and the party activists carefully watched the development of Lts V. Vasil'chenko and A. Skorikov, and promptly gave a hand. However this was not petty interference. The novices were given an opportunity to show independence and disclose their abilities.

As is known, the socialist competition, being the creativity of the masses, requires not only active support and encouragement of the leaders, but also the bringing out of those who have fallen behind or are not working with sufficient conscientiousness. This notion has become fundamental in the work of the party and Komsomol groups of the flight. The activists have endeavored above all to find new bits of experience and to make them available to all the personnel. They have shown particular concern for the laggards, and have helped them find their mistakes and lay out the correct ways to eliminate them. And here they used an exchange of experience between the leaders of the competition, glory leaflets and photo bulletins. The flight party organizer, Capt A. Shchegolev, skillfully employed visual agitation and oral propaganda, and saw to it that the vanguard role of the communists was more clearly

apparent, and the approach to the establishing of Leninist principles of the competition was made more exacting.

But there were instances when different measures had to be applied, measures of social action against violators. For example, in a crew which was fighting for leadership in the flight, a misdeed was committed by the Komsomol member, Officer V. Bobrovskiy. The comrades showed a very principled approach to the wrongdoer, and sharply condemned his conduct. Such unanimity of the collective and intolerance for such a manifestation of disrespect for its interests could not help but cause a feeling of realized guilt in V. Bobrovskiy. And still first place went to a different crew.

This example is an instructive one. It reemphasizes the principled and objective nature of the socialist competition and its great indoctrinational significance.

The flight carried out its obligations. In assessing the state of affairs, it can be said that the aviators are capable of carrying out difficult and responsible missions. They are fully determined in the future to increase their successes in combat training and properly greet the 26th CPSU Congress.

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YEARLY PLAN NECESSARY FOR DAILY SUCCESS

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 30-31

[Article by USSR Honored Military Pilot, Lt Gen Avn A. Borsuk: "The Plan Fulfilled for Flying Time. What Are the Results?"]

[Text] The training year is drawing to a close. The military aviators are making a maximum effort to fully carry out all the planned missions and to greet the 26th CPSU Congress with new successes in military and political training. For the commanders, political workers, staff and service officers the days are full of concern for organizing and carrying out the flights. But when one becomes acquainted with the preliminary results of the training year, when one compares and analyzes the achieved indicators, one involuntarily concludes that in our units the designated plans are being carried out in different ways.

An absolute majority of the military collectives has achieved good results, and is carrying out the designated assignment rhythmically, with a good and excellent quality. However, in some places one still sees the lag of certain pilots in mastering individual types of training, and in using the aircraft armament, although the combat pilots have very substantial flying time. It must be immediately emphasized that this lag is very insignificant. But such a situation cannot help but cause concern as the slow advancement of even a very small portion of flight personnel through the program to a certain degree reduces the combat readiness of the two-plane elements, flights and squadrons, and creates conditions for the occurrence of mistakes, and even potential air accidents.

Before taking up the concrete facts--both positive and negative--and showing what causes success and gives rise to failures, I would like to stop on the following point. Many years of experience of the air units and subunits which have worked without major violations of flight rules have convincingly shown that the carrying out of the prospective annual plans not only for flight time but primarily for the planned exercises is based on clear planning of the work for the month, the week, and the flight day (night), on effective control, constant analysis of what has been done and the working out of measures to use subsequently all the best and the rational and to eliminate what impedes progress. There is no other way to success.

Recently there have been encouraging results in combat training for the air regiment where Military Pilot 1st Class, Lt Col G. Pavlovskiy is the deputy commander. And comparatively recently the results were quite different. Not all the subunits in the unit were working with the same quality. For example, the squadron, one of

the flights of which was headed by Military Pilot 1st Class, Capt V. Grekhov, fulfilled the flight time plan, but lagged behind in carrying out individual missions.

Another squadron under the command of Lt Col A. Klich faced the same conditions, but the aviators had much higher successes. Once the regimental commander asked Klich:

"How have you been able to carry out the missions confronting you so completely? You have several young pilots and our weather has certainly not been good."

"There is no secret here," he replied, "simply each flight in our planning tables strictly corresponds to the annual plan, and from all the aircraft we endeavor to gain a maximum flying time for the shift."

The regimental command analyzed the fulfillment of the annual plan, and reached the conclusion that in compiling it the staffs of the squadrons and the unit had not fully considered the impact of a number of permanent, objective factors on the flights. In particular, there was the question of the basing conditions, the actual weather during the periods of instruction, and the air traffic conditions in the flight area. Certainly a portion of the blame here would have to be made at the door of the workers of the superior staff.

The necessary corrections had to be made. First of all, they reanalyzed the actual weather for the months of previous years. In clarifying the long-range plan for the squadron in which Capt Grekhov served, they more fully considered the major missions, particularly for the combat employment of the aircraft. The flight leaders were involved in this work, and this made it possible for them to more thoroughly understand their role and duties in the dynamics of the training process over the training periods and the months.

The quality and the effectiveness of air skills to a definite degree depend upon thorough consideration of the actual conditions in drawing up the plan for the month. The commander of the leading squadron, Lt Col A. Klich, and the subunit chief of staff approach this work creatively. With maximum accuracy they figure the flight time for the exercises and the use of aviation equipment, in endeavoring in every possible way that the training of the pilots for combat operations under various flight conditions be carried out successfully, that there is a rise in the cohesiveness of the regular groups and in tactical flight skills. The officers show great concern for carefully defining the subjects of the early theoretical exercises and the training on special equipment and in the aircraft cockpits which precedes the specific types of flights. With equal attention they approach the selection of the exercise leaders, when necessary seeking help from the regimental staff, the engineers, and the chiefs of the services in the unit.

In the regiment a special exercise was held on drawing up monthly plans. Lt Col Klich, from the example of working on bombing against a difficult tactical background, showed what they did in the squadron to carry out the decision of the unit commander, and what difficulties they experienced here. Then other officer leaders shared their experience. This told positively on the further activities of the officials.

One of the most important documents regulating flying is the flight planning table. Here concretely expressed are the procedural sequence for the instruction of the pilots, the intensity of use for the aircraft and support equipment, and other questions influencing the carrying out of the missions and flight safety. As a whole this is a model of the flight day, and the art of modeling, as is known, must be learned steadily and systematically.

A detailed assessment and comparison of several planning tables of the squadrons and flights provided the leadership of the regiment with an opportunity to conclude that here everything was far from what it should be. There were reserves the activating of which would tell positively in the effective use of each flying hour. And probably it is natural that the positions of chiefs who during long years of service have participated in the organization and planning of flights and the drawing up of the tables for specific flight shifts will be filled by new officers who as yet do not have sufficient experience in such work.

The deputy regimental commander for flight training and the chief of staff proposed that several supplementary exercises be held. The commander approved this initiative. Lt Cols Pavlovskiy and Klich, and the flight leader, Capt V. Koshkin, analyzed the planning tables of a number of flight shifts. After this the talk was business-like and concrete, shortcomings were discovered, and positive features commented on. Invited to the exercise were officers from the aviation engineer service, the flight control group, and the leadership of the support units. For all those present they became a good lesson for the future.

I have had a reason to devote so much attention to a discussion of the planning of flight training and its various stages. This process is not a simple one, and it, in my opinion, is fully described by the words of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who called planning the central element and core of leadership. But in life one at times encounters instances where the annual or monthly plan has been drawn with what at first glance seems good quality, but progress with good flying time is insignificant.

This happens for various reasons. One of them was pointed out by the USSR honored military pilot, Col Gen Avn V. Andreyev in his article "The Commander's Plan the Success of Flights" (AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 7, 1980). He rightly commented that the mistakes of the officer leaders in assessing the actual training level of subordinates have impeded the growth of pilot air skills.

I recall that in one of the units they had planned low-altitude en-route flights for the flights. In the opinion of the command, they had prepared thoroughly for them, but the plan was only partially carried out. Moreover, two pilots committed a serious potential accident.

A detailed analysis of this shift made it possible to draw the following conclusion. Seemingly, in making his plan, the commander had considered everything. But in actuality, he had overlooked the fact that previously the pilots had worked on an analogous problem under a less difficult situation.

The carrying out of a plan always requires great and diverse organizational work. Unfortunately, certain officer leaders sometimes forget this, considering control

and check of execution to be the main thing. This was the case in the unit where Lt Col Pavlovskiy served. And the commander acted correctly in promptly correcting them, in explaining to the comrades that flight training is a dynamic process and for ensuring success in it it is essential to have a comprehensive approach, the creation of certain conditions for the combat pilots to advance, the adjustment and correcting of missions, and the settling of questions of cooperation, and this is carried out by the regimental command.

For Military Pilot 1st Class, Maj V. Ivanov, for objective reasons, there was an extended break in flights under instrument flying conditions. He had to be more quickly returned to service. But the squadron's combat trainer at that time was loaded up to the limit. Everything developed so that the restoring of his skills could be drawn out over time.

The squadron commander were Officer V. Ivanov was serving, turned to the commander of a neighboring subunit which had two 2-man trainers. But the latter replied that they were both needed for training the young pilots, backing up his words with weighty arguments.

The regimental commander quickly settled this question. Having called in the officer leaders, he listened to their opinions, he ascertained how the combat pilots were advancing in the program, and then gave advice on how to use the combat trainer during the next flight shifts. The commander's decision played a positive role as the young pilots advanced without a break, while Maj Ivanov regained his skills in instrument flying and in the combat employment of the aircraft under instrument flying conditions.

As the question has been brought up of flights in instrument flying conditions, obviously the following point must be brought up. The mastery of this type of flight training must not be extended in time, otherwise there is an inevitable excessive use of equipment. At the same time, this also cannot be excessively condensed.

I would like to give one instructive example from practice. In one of the subunits, at the beginning of the training year the pilots were able to carry out the planned exercises with the established weather minimum. Having decided that the job had been done, the commander for several months did not allow his subordinates to train to maintain skills on the proper level. Quite understandably, this did not achieve anything good. Having taken off under instrument flying conditions, a pilot with a deterioration in the synoptic situation committed a major error. And his comrades who were checked out upon a decision of the senior chief did not fare much better. With even training for such flights this would not have happened.

As life shows, greater efficiency from each flight shift, without exception, would help in successfully carrying out the set tasks. One of the dependable ways fr increasing this efficiency is to integrate the exercises. But sometimes it happens that a large portion of the flight time is not used for achieving its basic purpose. Let us briefly examine the following example.

Let us assume that they have planned cannon firing at a ground target using a certain type of maneuver. The pilot spent 4 minutes over the range, but 40 in the air. Hence, 90 percent of the time went to "idle" flying. Of course, there is no absolutely useless flying time, but the return from the flight primarily for those who

had performed the exercise many times was very slight. At the same time, it does not require much effort to increase it by double or even triple, if in addition to cannon firing the pilot were also to practice bombing or the firing of missiles.

Advance commanders successfully employ combined exercises in interceptions, in working on attacks against ground targets, and other exercises. Of course, here one must be circumspect and strictly consider the individual skills of the pilot. The saturating of a mission with various elements must not be permitted during the period of the initial execution of the mission, and complications are useful and justified only when a person does everything, as a minimum, with a good quality.

Undoubtedly, the intensification of the flight process has nothing in common with its forcing, with a rush campaign, or with violating the existing training procedures. To protect oneself against these bad phenomena means to ensure dependable flight safety. Effective, firm control and a self-critical assessment of personal labor and the achieved results serve as a dependable barrier against them.

In the regiment where officer Pavlovskiy is the deputy commander, a clear system has been organized for collecting data on the fulfillment of the plan, accounting and reporting. This makes it possible for the commander and the staff to specifically analyze what has been done, and to directly eliminate the detected shortcomings. Here it has long been the rule and requirement to hold weekly conferences with the leadership of the regiment and the support units. The work is judged using such criteria as the advancement of the pilots through the problems, the overall flying time and flying time for the types of training, the use factor of the aircraft equipment, the flying time for one combat employment and the average flying time for a pilot per shift, the opportunities for combining missions, the quality of flight safety, and certain others. Then at the meeting they determine the methods and areas of activities for the chiefs for the following week.

The regiment makes good use of one other method of control. In addition to solving the questions provided by the instructions, in the preliminary analysis of the flights an assessment is constantly made of the quality of planning for the flight shift. Any omission tells negatively on the work of the officials in the flight control group, and for this reason their comments are given particular attention and are constantly considered in the future.

The dependable guarantee for high quality flight training is to be found in its strict planning, rhythmicalness and consistency. This must always be remembered by everyone who organizes and conducts flights.

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INSTRUCTOR, FIRST SOLO FLIGHT DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 p 34

[Article by Lt Col L. Mazyrin: "An Invisible Line"]

[Text] It was a day for the first solo flights. The mood of everyone was high.

"Well, finally our hour has come!" said Officer Candidate A. Yefremov with excitement, expressing the overall emotional tone.

The young aviators today were active and were endeavoring to show that they knew a good deal and could do much. The instructor pilot Capt A. Ivanov carefully observed his students, their conduct and mood. The officer was pleased for V. Novikov, A. Kirichenko and the other officer candidates. But recently the conduct of Officer Candidate A. Kuznetsov had caused concern for the instructor. The officer noticed that Kuznetsov was at times excessively fidgety, at one moment concentrating and ponderous, and the next absent minded.

"At present he must not be allowed to fly," the instructor decided firmly. However he wanted the officer candidate himself to judge his emotional mood and report that he was unready to carry out the mission. When the officer asked whether everyone was ready to solo, Aleksandr Kuznetsov frankly and honestly said: "I am not ready." The instructor could almost physically feel the invisible, but heavy and oppressive burden which had mercilessly pressed on him during these last minutes of waiting dissolve and disappear. "Well," he thought, "the first hurdle is past. The fellow is worth fighting for."

In instructor work it often happens that in working with the officer candidates the instructing officer must mobilize all his will, ability and pedagogical skill.

In going through the inspection program, Officer Candidate O. Gorbatenko could not master the landing. Everything was going fine. The take-off, the flight around the circle, and then the approach to the landing. But as soon as he heard the signals from the outer marker in his headset, Gorbatenko began to get noticeably nervous, and his movements became abrupt and spasmodic.

The instructor pilot, Sr Lt G. Lushchenok, in understanding the state of the officer candidate, explained to him why he still could not land solo.

The instructor carefully thought out and had approved by the flight leader a method and plan for additional exercises with Gorbatenko. In all instances the officer endeavored to activate the volitional and emotional qualities of the trainee. Gradually Gorbatenko mastered the procedures for operating the controls, he gained confidence and began to solo.

Of course, confidence in oneself is an important factor in acquiring and improving professional skills. It helps to raise the combat spirit of a pilot, and makes him stronger, more cool headed, and tenacious in achieving the goal. However it must not be forgotten that these qualities are gained in constant labor, and are instilled daily in studying the equipment, and in working through the skills in piloting a simulator and in the aircraft cockpit. An instructor not only teaches an officer candidate the practical aspects of his future profession, but also gives constant attention to his moral and ethical education. And here the concepts of military honor, valor and pride in one's specialty should be, as they say, on top.

One instructive instance comes to mind. In landing Officer Candidate Yu. Kulagin discovered that the wheels had not lowered. He reported this to the ground and following the instructions of the flight controller, tried out all the possibilities for lowering them. This did not help. Finally the officer candidate decided to land the aircraft with the wheels up on the ground. He convinced himself that the flight would end safely, and he acted coolly and confidently. And when the landing was made, everything went well. In describing his actions to his comrades, Kulagin properly assessed the aerodynamic qualities of his aircraft. One of the officer candidates listened closely to his fellow serviceman, and then said:

"Whatever the case, there was a failure, although caused by the specialist."

In the following days, this officer candidate refused to fly and said that he did not feel well. Only later did he frankly admit that the landing of the aircraft with the wheels up for some time had shaken his confidence in the safety of the equipment.

The instructor pilot was an experienced and sensitive psychologist. He immediately guessed what circumstances had influenced the officer candidate, and he never reminded the young aviator of them if there were problems, he instilled confidence, he worked individually with him a great deal, and endeavored to help him correctly analyze the causes of mistakes. All of this helped. After some time the officer candidate mastered the equipment, he gained confidence, he fully mastered the flight instruction program, and became a military pilot.

There lies quite a distance from the first solo flight to graduation from school. And precisely during it the officer candidate gains the necessary volitional, physical and professional tempering, and his further flight career will largely depend upon these qualities.

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FIGHTER-BOMBER TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Sr Lt Yu. Burylin: "And the Change Came About"]

[Text] In the cacophony of airfield sounds, the roar of two other engines was added smoothly, almost unnoticed. Soon the pair of fighter bombers taxied away from the parking area. Glancing at the aircraft, the squadron commander said:

"Capt Trukhachev and Lt Petrukhin are off to the range. You can set your watch by their take-off."

And in fact, the missile-carrying planes lifted off from the runway at the time strictly designated in the planning table. Then almost immediately communist Yuriy Trukhachev set the required heading for the flight to the objective of the strike was to be a low altitude. Without the slightest hesitation, the Komsomol member Vladimir Petrukhin executed the maneuver.

The mission was not an easy one, to seek out and destroy small-sized "enemy" targets. Success would be determined by precise calculation, excellent piloting techniques, and surprise. In hugging the ground, the aircraft after a certain time reached the hypothetical frontline. The watch indicated that several minutes remained to the range.

The Military Pilot 1st Class, Officer Trukhachev asked permission for the approach and the flying conditions. "Everything according to plan," replied the ground. Having executed an antiaircraft maneuver, the flight leader, turning, came out at the previously designated point. From here the fighter bombers one after another climbed steeply. Seconds were spent on seeking their targets.

"120 on the bombing run," came the firm voice of the leader.

In picking up speed, Trukhachev's plane dived toward the ground. The aiming. The pressing of the firing button. The strike was accurate.

The wingman attacked the target just as skillfully. Plumes from the explosions of the rockets fired by Lt Petrukhin rose in the center of the target.

The second run of the fighter bombers was also a success. The mission was carried out. In descending the planes returned to the airfield. Still another high grade was added to the gifts of the unit aviators to the approaching 26th CPSU Congress.

Somewhat before the mission had been successfully carried out by two other pilots of the flight headed by Capt Trukhachev, the communists, Sr Lt Vladimir Afanas'yev and Lt Gennadiy Kraynov.

"A Day of Training--A Step Forward in Combat Advancement" this is the motto under which the aviators complete to properly celebrate the coming high forum of the communists in our country. The planned goals are being reached steadily, and in military service the officers are the equal of the commander. And he has spared no forces or time so that the skill of his subordinates grows constantly.

"The communist, Capt Trukhachev is one of the best mentors of young pilots," said the squadron commander. "Under his leadership they confidently gain their wings."

The present lieutenants are not the first whom Yuriy Trukhachev has sent into the skies. Aleksandr Laguta, Igor' Yurkevskiy and others are grateful to him for his knowledge. In training them, the flight leader also himself gained experience in training and indoctrinating subordinates.

...Capt Trukhachev did not experience any usual satisfaction after the flight that day. Looking at Lt Petrukhin, he noticed that the pilot was very upset. And he thought: "For some reason the flight to the zone on the 2-man trainer clearly did not succeed." The pilot had made several substantial mistakes. In one stage of the flight the instructor was even forced to take over the control of the trainer as the trainee had lost speed in being too concerned with maintaining the set altitude.

It is rare when one of the beginning combat pilots does everything immediately as is required. And at one time Trukhachev himself had his failures. The flight leader knew that the main thing was to seek out their cause as quickly as possible. He had already drawn his conclusion about Petrukhin's shortcomings.

The pilot had excellently executed the take-off, the approach and the calculation for the landing, and had confidently landed the fighter bomber. But in the zone he felt somewhat constrained and for some reason lacked attention. This had happened repeatedly, particularly after certain breaks in the flights.

"Comrade captain, may I have your comments?" In Petrukhin's voice there were hints of excitement.

"He is bothered," commented Trukhachev to himself, and said outloud:

"Let us go over here."

They sat down not far from the runway. At first the captain asked the pilot a couple of questions which did not have direct bearing on the concluded flight. There was enough time and Trukhachev wanted his subordinate to catch his breath and relax a little. Only after this did the instructor begin a thorough, professional discussion.

The analysis of the flight lasted a long time. The flight leader demanded that the lieutenant himself analyze his actions in the air. He listened to his subordinate without interrupting. Then he said:

"You must fly more calmly, and correct your mistakes more prudently, with smooth motions. This is a general comment. Now let us take up the individual figures of the maneuver."

Capt Trukhachev made it a good rule not to overlook even the slightest mistakes of the pilots. And this time he also followed it, explaining in detail how the lieutenant must operate the controls, and where to look at what moment of flying. The materials of the monitoring equipment substantiated the conclusions and recommendations of the flight leader.

"Enough for now," said Trukhachev in conclusion. "But we will come back to this flight."

The instructor commander had already drawn up a precise program for future work. The psychological stress arose out of a certain lack of training in Petrukhin. Hence, first of all his theoretical knowledge had to be added to. It would also be very beneficial for the lieutenant to do additional work on the simulator. And then there would be a new checkout flight in the two-man trainer.

The captain led his subordinate along this path. The professional advice of Trukhachev was a good support for the lieutenant in the flight. And each time the commander inobtrusively said to him: "You will be able to surmount all the difficulties."

And a change came about. And after this came success. And the instructor was sincerely pleased for the victory of the combat pilot over himself and for his first high grades in piloting.

"A young pilot does not always know where or when he can make a mistake," reflected the communist, Capt Trukhachev in our meeting, "but I, his commander, must know this."

It was a question of the foresight of a senior. When this exists, it is easier to carry out preventive work. In order to say precisely and definitely how a subordinate will behave in one or another situation, the instructor studies in detail the strong and weak points of the pilots using their personal files, in talking with them, from conversations with the party and Komsomol activists, and most importantly, during flights and in analyzing them from the data of the monitoring equipment.

At one time things were not going well for Lt Gennadiy Kraynov in crossing the "enemy" air defense zones. And without this there was no true combat pilot capable of skillfully carrying out the received mission under any air situation. The flight leader was fully aware of what had to be done. There followed additional flights on the combat trainer and the most detailed analyses of them. Yuriy Trukhachev advised the young officer to more thoroughly study the capabilities of the air defense weapons, and he tested his knowledge. Repeatedly the commander gave examples from his personal experience.

Time passed and the captain was fully aware that the young flyer had mastered the combat maneuvering needed for his professional development. But Kraynov himself was not confident of this and for this reason failures pursued the lieutenant.

"There are no barriers which cannot be taken," communist Trukhachev repeated constantly. "You can execute the required maneuvers in the air defense zone. Gather your will in a fist and fight. Fight with yourself."

And the young officer emerged the victor from this fight. During one of the flights he perfectly executed the given maneuver. After this the lack of confidence disappeared.

"I try to teach my subordinates stubbornness, certainly, in the best sense of this word," said Trukhachev. "A stubborn person does not fear a few bumps and bruises, and progresses more firmly toward the set goal."

Well and simply said: To teach stubbornness. At one time Yuriy Trukhachev was indoctrinated in the same manner by his mentors, Officers Anatoliy Bogadushko, Vyacheslav Startsev and Aleksandr Babenko. And he did not forget the lessons of purposefulness and assertiveness which he was given at various times by his fellow servicemen. And he makes full use of them now in working with the young flyers.

The most important obligation of a pilot who flies a fighter bomber is the ability in the shortest time to dependably hit the enemy ground personnel and equipment. And the flight leader prepares his subordinates for this sparing neither time nor energy. In the squadron they remember how the pilots mastered one of the types of combat employment.

It took several flights for Kraynov and Petrukhin to achieve steady high grades in camera firing. And it was felt that they would use live ammunition in the same way. But the grades for the missile launches were significantly lower.

The reason for what had happened was no deep mystery for communist Trukhachev. He quickly realized that the young officers had not been able to prepare themselves psychologically for work with the actual use of the aircraft's armament.

And again exercises followed in the classroom. Capt Trukhachev analyzed the actions of a pilot in attacking a ground target down to the smallest detail. Again and again the young combat pilots took to the electronic skies of the simulator. In analyzing their work, the commander repeatedly said: "[illegible]l be able to fire accurately, you should be able."

And the next step in professional skills was taken.

...The airfield was alive with intense activities. The powerful missile-carrying aircraft were taking off into the skies and landing after carrying out the missions. And the two-plane element of Capt Yuriy Trukhachev and Sr Lt Vladimir Afanas'yev had returned a second time from the range. For this flight they were also given high grades. The leaders of the precongress competition are fully determined day by day to add to the successes in mastering combat skills in order to properly celebrate the 63d anniversary of Great October.

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ACTIVITIES OF AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE CREWS DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 40-41

[Article by Col V. Lebedev: "The Vigilance of a Commander"]

[Text] He does not take off into the cloudy distance, and does not leave his trail in the sky. But each day he works for the sake of the flights. Maj N. Karapets heads a separate airfield operation company [obato]. The officer is often one of the first to show up at the field in order to personally make certain that the runway, the fuel and lubricant service, the motor vehicle, electric and gas equipment, the fire crew and everything necessary for the flight shift are ready.

Service is not easy in these distant areas, particularly for the commander of an obato. Not everyone can endure the harsh climate. But Maj Karapets likes it here, and he is fond of the early mornings which are generously scented by the fragrant grassland. Nikolay Timofeyevich [Karapets] went out on his balcony. The fresh breath of air bathed his face. He looked toward the range. The evening before he had instructed the subordinates of WO ["praporshchik"] I. Stankevich to set up the targets, and to carefully inspect the tower from where the regimental commander would direct the actions of the fighter pilots during firing.

The flights started on time. They were carried out in an organized and precise manner. One could feel that both the pilots, the technicians and the rear service personnel were caught up in the high spirit of the precongress competition. During this flight shift, the rear service personnel had faultlessly supported field firing and the flights as a whole, having merited an excellent grade.

"The airfield should always be combat ready, in any periods of the year," Maj Karapets often reminded his subordinates.

In checking how preparations were being carried out for winter operations, he was content with the work of the personnel in the airfield operation company commanded by Capt V. Lapyrov. The men had neatly sealed the joints between the concrete slabs and had redone the airfield markings. It was the middle of June, but a significant amount of work had already been done on the field. The commander paid particular attention to the filling of the seams with asphalt. He considered this important matter the number one task. If the damaged areas of the runway, the taxiways and aircraft parking areas were not promptly repaired, then small stones, chips of gravel and pieces of wire could get into the air intakes during the take-off and landing of the aircraft and cause damage to the units and systems of the aircraft engine.

Nikilay Timofeyevich showed sincere concern for the everyday life of the men in the airfield operation company. On his initiative they had built a shower and a recreation room. Additional food was regularly delivered here during the intense shifts of airfield cleaning and maintenance. And well organized everyday life meant an excellent mood of the men, the highest labor productivity, and good relations in the collective.

In the past there had been instances of the freezing of engines in the obato. As a communist and officer leader, Karapets could not tolerate this situation. At one of the meetings the stated category:

"We will force the heat into the cells. We will solve this problem and insure ourselves against any eventuality."

Not everyone, of course, at first understood the commander's plan. Certainly it was not easy to force the heat into the cells, where quite recently there had been cracks in the walls, there was no glass in certain window frames, and the wind howled through the areas. A whole range of jobs had to be carried out: the heat lines and boilers repaired, stokers chosen, and a sufficient amount of fuel delivered.

This question was discussed at a unit party meeting. It was held in a professional manner. Those participating in the debates made concrete proposals. The collective discussion brought results. And when the time came, each person, profoundly aware of his responsibility for the forthcoming work, set to carrying out the assignment outlined by the commander.

Time passed in intense days and concern. Finally the moment came when the large amount of work was completed and heat had arrived in the cells. The equipment operating conditions had been significantly improved. And last winter which was marked by permanent frosts, not a single engine or unit failed.

During the cold time of the year, the drivers have a lot of problems with the lack of hot water. Without it in a cold snap it is not so easy to warm an engine and start it.

"No, this won't do," said Nikolay Timofeyevich to his deputy, Maj Yu. Prokop'yev. "Yuriy Aleksandrovich [Prokop'yev], we must immediately set up a water heater in the motor vehicle park."

"We must think how to do this better and more conveniently," replied Prokop'yev.

"We must draw up a plan, locate the needed materials, select the executors, give them the task, set the dates and institute constant control."

The question of hot water was solved. There was a similar instance with the hothouse. Due to the lack of heat, the vegetable crop was extremely meager. Adroit hands and a true eye were needed to correct the situation.

Nikolay Timofeyevich had long been interested in the food service. He had noticed that its chief worked half-heartedly and did not show initiative and creativity. Having become closely acquainted with the state of affairs and having analyzed everything carefully, Karapets invited the workers to him. He looked at his watch. Everyone arrived on time.

The battalion commander avoided long conferences and did not distract subordinates from their job because of minor matters. If some question was brought up for review, then he first studied it thoroughly, and sought advice from his deputies and the chiefs of the services. If possible he endeavored to settle secondary matters on the spot, directly in the subunit, in order not to waste time.

There was a sharp and principled conversation. The commander frankly, without concealing the difficulties, spoke with the people. Of course, things would not get off dead center by just meetings and conferences. It required from the commander enormous restraint, tenacity, and the ability to inspire and lead subordinates. And for this constant contact with them, pedagogical tact and the ability to listen patiently were needed.

These qualities greatly helped the commander shape up the food service and force its chief to work with more initiative. Soon the hothouse was reequipped. Now it raises onions, cucumbers, radishes, parsley and sorrel. They are thinking about growing tomatoes.

Twice the personnel of the subunit participated in responsible exercises. They demanded from the rear service specialists, high skills, precise teamwork, efficiency, and great moral and physical stress. As always, the obato commander worked at full strength, leading his subordinates by personal example. And both times the men received an outstanding grade for the support of the tactical flight exercise.

These successes are the result of the work of the entire collective. But undoubtedly a major role has been played by the commander. Nikolay Timofeyevich does everything required by the regulations. And in his every step one can see a precise and clear initial position: to work better today than yesterday, and tomorrow better than today. To rise to a level higher means not to put off to tomorrow what you can do today, not to count the minutes and hours devoted to a job, and to self-critically view how your working time is spent. Certainly it is possible to spend entire days in service, to frequently visit the subunits, exercises and training sessions, but the shortcomings as before will make themselves felt. Karapets has taken up the rule: If you are going to visit an airfield operation company or motor transport regiment, then see to it that your visit is not in vain and that your subordinates remember the day when the commander visited their subunit.

He can be found everywhere. And not only during the day. The personnel of the airfield operation company is preparing the runway for flights at night, and the commander appears. No, he is not here until the crowing of the third cock. He stays as long as is required for the benefit of the job. And for the benefit of the job he attends Komsomol meetings, special subject evening meetings and political exercises.

Once I happened to hear the conversation:

"And where was Karapets all this time?"

"He is the commander and his time is his own."

"He will come see you! He has done the same in other positions."

And he did the same. Meaning with a knowledge of the job and with party strictness.

After completing military aviation technical school, Nikolay Timofeyevich trained several years and became a fighter pilot. Later on he was in Komsomol work, and held the position of deputy battalion commander for political affairs. Having completed training in a VUZ, he first became the deputy and later the commander of the obato.

During one of the flight days, the commander and I drove out to the field. There was a haze hanging over the sun-scorched runway. It was approaching noon. A small area of the runway had already been carefully treated.

"Good fellows, they are trying to complete all the work on time," commented the commander on the men of the airfield operation company.

From the field we headed to the vehicle park. Having noticed that the territory had not been picked up, Maj Karapets turned severe. The smile disappeared from his face, and his grey eyes expressed dissatisfaction.

"Immediately straighten up not only on the street, but also in the boiler room," he ordered the company commander and reminded him: "I will inspect at the end of the day!"

Capt V. Lapyrov endeavored to justify himself by the large amount of work for his subordinates in preparing the airfield and the equipment for winter operations.

"The arguments are not convincing. I advise you in the future not to conceal your negligence and laxness by any objective reasons. It is better to give some thought to what we are spending our service time and the labor of subordinates for. Is it for nothing that we sometimes spend precious hours in limiting ourselves to just our presence in service?"

In the evening we came back here. The territory of the parking area was transformed. On duty at the KPP [?regimental command post] was a smart soldier in a well-ironed uniform and shining boots.

"In the park there is little visual agitation devoted to the leaders of the socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress," said Karapets to Lapyrov. "Make a note of this."

I happened to be present at one of the officer meetings at which the commander gave the assignment for the next day. I immediately noticed the professional style: the terse reports by the commanders of the subunits and the chiefs of the services, the preciseness and brevity of the instructions of the obato commander. Nikolay Timofeyevich developed the idea of each intelligent proposal and gave good reasons for his ideas.

"In approaching the 26th Congress of our Leninist party, each of us must critically approach the assessment of his work in order to work even better, at full strength, in order so that we have something to report to the high party forum about our work," the commander emphasized.

Immediately after the announcement of the convening of the 26th CPSU Congress, a plan was drawn up in the unit for party political work. It outlined measures to strengthen organizational and ideological work by the communist leaders, and to raise the personal example of the officers in carrying out their service duty. Upon the initiative of the obato commander, the men assumed specific socialist obligations in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The engines fell silent. Dusk had long since passed. Quiet night had fallen. Nikolay Timofeyevich got in the car and told the driver:

"And now home, it is time for a rest!"

"Comrade Major, what grade did we receive today for servicing the flights?" asked Pfc A. Smirnov, putting the car in gear.

"Today we again received a five [the highest grade] for the support of the flights," replied the commander.

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10272
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NAVAL FORCES: REST AND RECREATION FACILITY CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Polishchuk: "A Banquet Around the Campfire"]

[Text] "We would like very much to request the editorial board to investigate the organization of recreation at the Pacific Fleet's Sokol Visitors' Center. The wasted time is a pity." Ye. Paraushkina and G. Sadovskaya from Sverdlovsk, S. and L. Kryukova and other vacationers from various cities of the country appealed to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA with this letter.

The letter mentions serious deficiencies in the organization of excursions, hiking and everyday living and recreation. It should be said right off: the visitors' complaints proved to be completely correct, and the incidents they cited had occurred as stated.

Visitors begin to feel the disorder even prior to arrival at the fleet's center. No one meets them, and the people wander with their suitcases for a long time around the unfamiliar locality before they reach their goal. But their mishaps do not end there. There is no place for the arrivals to wash up from the trip--the shower room is under a heavy lock, and there is no hot water. It is not so easy to put clothing in order--the pressing irons are constantly out of order.

Elementary conveniences are lacking at the center, and there are no tables, chairs, closets or bedside tables in the rooms. Some visitors have had to sleep on the floor the first days, or on bare mattresses, without sheets or pillows. The bedding, it so happens, had been out on loan to a neighboring vacation house, Pioneer camp or military unit. However, the head of the tourist center, A. Tkachenko, is unperturbed. It is as if none of this concerned him, and the striving of matron L. Chikalova to find a way out of the situation does not lead to anything. It should be added that the visitors' center does not have its own beach, club or library, and there is nowhere to obtain elementary medical attention.

Meals for the visitors are organized in 2-3 shifts. It is difficult to believe, but the supply organs of the fleet's logistics system have not managed to bring in table utensils--the visitors' center chief does not allocate the transport. Additional foodstuffs issued for hikers at times are not used for the purposes intended. For the staffworkers, together with A. Tkachenko, sometimes arrange for themselves night "banquets," and these picnics are explained on paper as nothing but "campfires" for the guests.

In brief, Sokol is not in any way accomplishing its important mission--to enable visitors to get good recreation. Newspapers are not delivered to the visitors' center, and there are no radio outlets in the cottages. Sports and touring and sightseeing trips, which are aimed at an acquaintance with the district's natural riches and with local revolutionary, military and labor glory, and, finally, at improvement of people's health, have been neglected in the extreme. For, can it be considered normal when only one or two excursions per month, which moreover often miscarry, are planned? It thus happens here that the vistors are compelled to kill time playing dominoes or the card game "Preference." And so for some, "active" recreation passes by in tobacco smoke and the clatter of dice.

In organizing fruitful recreation at a visitors' center, much depends upon the instructors, who should possess appropriate knowledge, be able to work with people and to rally them, and to attract people to trips and sports. Unfortunately, there are not enough qualified instructors here.

It is not so simple of course, to find and to recruit the needed specialist for the work. Mainly because the center is experiencing a severe need for housing for staff workers. This is one of the reasons that the Sokol staff is only half manned right now.

But the visitors must be understood: they have paid money for bookings, and they have come here counting on a warm reception, good accommodations and food and service, even when on hikes. Naturally, they are disturbed by the many deficiencies, the low qualification and even the simply negligent attitude of the staff workers in fulfilling their direct responsibilities. There are multitudes of such examples, but I will cite only one of them: instructor S. Milyusov, who had been named leader of an involved 6-day hike, after arriving at the intended place, spent one night and utterly disappeared, leaving the group to the mercies of fate. Needless to say, such irresponsibility can lead to the saddest consequences, especially for beginner travelers.

It would seem that the justified reprimands against the Sokol Visitors' Center would have disturbed the chief of Tourism and Excursions of the Pacific Fleet, Lt Col V. Kuternitskiy. However, in a conversation with the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, not objecting in principle to the indisputable facts, he stubbornly referred to objective causes, striving to justify thereby the great confusion.

It is apparent that the Pacific Fleet command and the logistics management, to which Sokol is subordinate, should take the necessary steps to eliminate the serious deficiencies in the work of the fleet's sole visitors' center.

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GROUND FORCES: PARTY-POLITICAL WORK

Communist as Exemplary Leader

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen I. Repin, military council member, Political Directorate chief, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District]

[Text] The officers were conducting a field firing exercise involving direct laying. It began unsuccessfully from the very beginning. First a certain young officer received an unsatisfactory score, and a little later another received the same. It was obvious that excessive anxiety let them down. Perhaps this could be explained by the fact that the firing exercises were being conducted in the course of an inspection, and that they had decisive significance to the unit's overall score.

"Will you permit me?" political section chief Officer I. Pavlenkov asked the inspector.

He approached the gun, said something to the crew, and surveyed the haze-lined training field that was covered to the far horizon by low shrubbery concealing targets that were invisible to the unaided eye.

This time it only took one shot to hit the target. The example of the communist leader turned the tide in the mood of the people and in the course of the firing exercise.

The personal example of communists, their creative restlessness, and their energetic efforts to constantly improve their military proficiency and their special and political knowledge have always been the most important prerequisites of high troop combat readiness, of creating a healthy moral atmosphere, good order, and efficient organization in military collectives. It is especially necessary for those who head the subunits and units and those who work in the directorates and staffs to stay on top of things, so to speak. Success in executing the missions facing the troops today and the moral-political climate in the collectives depend in many ways on the competency and efficiency of communist leaders and on their political maturity.

Many good changes occurred in the life of the district's troops in the time since the 25th CPSU Congress. Typically, for example, our personnel mastered a Leninist work style, their authority climbed higher, and their influence upon the state of affairs in the military collectives grew stronger in this period. We can say in regard to the overwhelming majority of the commanders, political workers, engineers, and technicians that they have achieved organic unity of party principles with deep competency, of discipline with initiative and a creative approach to the work, and that they account for the political and educational aspects of their activity.

Take as an example the commander of the district's missile troops and artillery, Lieutenant General of Artillery B. Sharyy. He is an experienced, well-educated leader, and a competent indoctrinator of his subordinates. It is the nature of his duty to resolve all sorts of special issues. But here is one thing that is remarkable. Whenever he visits the troops, Communist Sharyy finds himself extremely busy with official duties, but he always finds the time to acquaint himself with the life of the party and Komsomol organizations, and to give a lecture or a briefing to a unit or subunit, and sometimes to simply talk with the people. Such direct contact with the personnel, such lively, interested talks with the officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men helps the general, in his opinion, to account more fully for the most diverse factors and, consequently, to perform his duties better. Commanders and political workers learn a proper work style and the ability to maintain constant and close ties with the masses from their senior comrade.

There are many such examples. Take staff officer Communist Ye. Makhov, well known and respected in the district's troops. He believes that being an active organizer and indoctrinator of the masses is an inseparable part of his official and party responsibilities.

We can name dozens of other comrades distinguished by a high sense of responsibility not only for the results of combat training but also for a healthy moral-political climate in the collectives, and for the mood of the people. We can often hear kind words about them from their subordinates: One he helped out by catching a mistake in time, another he supported in a difficult minute, and a third he steered toward the right solution to a difficult problem. In other words such communists provide their subordinates with a worthy impression of the countenance of the modern leader, of the style and methods of his work.

It stands to reason that good work and moral-political qualities do not arise spontaneously. They are nurtured and developed in communists in the course of their practical activities. Political organs and party organizations in the district do a great deal to make communist leaders ideologically mature, to nurture a keen sense of responsibility for their theoretical knowledge and for the state of affairs in the areas under their supervision. For example it is now a broad practice here for executives to write abstracts on topics having to do with development of military affairs, and to actively participate in scientific-practical conferences and seminars on the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and on further growth of the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Problems associated with the ideological maturity of executives are at the center of attention of the military council and the district's political directorate; they are also reflected in meetings of the active party members and the party organizations.

Our district's party organizations base their daily activities on the idea that sound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory is a prerequisite of a communist leader's successful work. But this is only one aspect of the matter. The most important thing is to carry this knowledge to the soldier masses, to indoctrinate them in the spirit of high political awareness, and constant readiness to defend the motherland. Here the role of the communist leaders is extremely great. In this connection I would like to dwell specially on their participation in the all-forces political days. This form of work has firmly entered the practice of personnel indoctrination. Simultaneous participation in all-forces political days insures growth of the leaders themselves as the party's political warriors, and enriches them with life experience and the experience of working with people.

Formation of lofty party and official qualities in communist leaders is a complex, multifaceted, and continuous process. I have absolutely no intention to make it seem that we have already done everything in our district in this regard, or that everything is being done as we would want it to be done. Unfortunately, we still have executives who say one thing but do another, who perform their responsibilities without the required enthusiasm, who fail to serve as an example to those surrounding them. Serious reproach was earned in this respect by Officer P. Pilipenko, a party member. He did little to determine the state of affairs in the collective under his charge, he often condoned simplifications and laxity in personnel training and indoctrination, he did not take decisive steps to eliminate shortcomings, and he did not distinguish himself as an example of personal behavior. All of this had an unfavorable effect on his military collective. It can also be said that Comrade Pilipenko undermined an executive's authority in the eyes of his subordinates. He forgot that a leader gained his strength from close communication with people, from an ability to make them see things his way, from the personal example he offered in all things, great and small.

The leader is always visible. He is often imitated, and his acts and habits are copied. He is perpetually in the "line of fire" of dozens and hundreds of eyes. All of this imposes special responsibility upon people standing at the head of their collectives, requiring them to test out every step they take. The slightest deviation from the rules of communist morality does irreversible harm to both the authority of the individual and sometimes the authority of the position.

Practice shows that unprincipled behavior, lack of discipline, irresponsibility, and pretentiousness are displayed mainly by leaders of those units in which the primary party organizations condone shortcomings, in which criticism is gagged, and in which communists are not made answerable for their actions and behavior. For example, what can we say of the responsibility and sociopolitical activity of Officer V. Suleymanov, a communist, if, on being given the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist training group, he did not personally conduct a single lesson with a subordinate? Unfortunately the political organ failed to deal with this fact promptly and correctly.

Such phenomena must be eliminated decisively. In a recent meeting of the district's military council, during which measures for improving work with executives were discussed, leaders who do their work without adequate persistence, who participate reluctantly in political work with people, and who deviate from the rules of communist morality were subjected to sharp criticism.

High exactingness toward oneself and toward leaders at all levels is displayed, for example, by the commander, the deputy commander for political affairs, and the secretary of the party bureau of a certain tank regiment. In this unit, execution of orders is always subjected to follow-up inspection, and communist subunit commanders and service chiefs reply to criticisms in an atmosphere of high exactingness, with great benefit to the common good. Well-wishing but frank party discussion and concrete recommendations have their required influence upon the communists, and they help them to critically evaluate their work style and behavior, and to avoid mistakes in service and social activities.

In this aspect the party election meetings presently being conducted in the units and the forthcoming party conferences are called upon to play an important role. Concrete, principled, and constructive criticism offered at these meetings must be directed in its full volume toward all communists, including communist leaders, who fail to serve as an example of a responsible attitude toward the work. No one in our party has been or can be immune to the powerful healing force of criticism.

In addition to holding a high post, the communist leader assumes an additional moral load, higher responsibility for the entire make-up of the life of the military unit or subunit, and for the combat readiness and political-moral fate of his subordinates. He is entrusted with many things, and the demands imposed upon him are high. This is why it is the duty of political organs and party organizations to purposefully make executives real political warriors and competent indoctrinators. Here lies a guarantee of successful completion of the missions of further reinforcement of combat readiness, and achievement of high goals in the competition for an honorable welcome to the 26th CPSU Congress.

Role of Party in Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Correspondent Maj V. Zhitarenko, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Duty of the Leaders"]

[Text] Memories of what happened still linger on in the division. For 3 years in a row the tank regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Sobkov was the leader in the socialist competition. Then one time during a tactical exercise three of the tanks arrived in their appointed area late because of technical difficulties. Although the tank crews were generally quite successful in their tactical and firing missions, the exercise leader dropped their overall scores, and the leading regiment relinquished its place to others.

I recall turning my attention to this instability in the results achieved by the competition's best during a talk with the division's political section chief. The political worker replied:

"Unfortunately, somewhere along the line they forgot the rules of preserving and operating the equipment. But I'm sure that the situation will be corrected. I'm sure because their main link is strong--the organizing role of the officers in all the life and activities of the regiment."

The unit's officer complement.... Combat readiness doubtlessly depends to a decisive extent on how fruitfully the organizers and leaders of training and indoctrination work--from the platoon commander to the unit commander. It depends on their theoretical knowledge, experience, teaching skill, and diligence.

This is what the discussion centered on at a party conference of the Guards Tank Ural'sk-L'vov Volunteer Division imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy. The following figures were presented in a report given by the division's political section chief, Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Khor'kov: Almost all of the formation's officers had a higher military or specialized education. Most of them were communists. And wherever officers give their all to the work, problems associated with combat training and with reinforcing military discipline are solved successfully.

The chief of the political section was right when he suggested his opinion about the main link in the regiment. After the exercise the regiment held an open party meeting, with all officers participating. The role of every platoon, company, and battalion commander in increasing his own technical knowledge and skills, and his ability to transmit these skills to subordinates were objectively discussed in the meeting. The reasons why the three combat vehicles broke down were concretely analyzed. The conclusions offered good grounds for generalization. In particular some commanders delegated the task of competent operation and maintenance of combat equipment basically to their deputies for technical affairs, reserving for themselves the role of "pure tacticians", however defined. Paradoxical though this may seem, many recent school graduates adhered to this opinion, believing that delving into equipment problems themselves bordered on the dishonorable.

The discussion was continued at a meeting of the party committee and in all battalion and company party organizations. The concrete problems of greatest urgency to the regiment were examined at technical conferences conducted on the initiative of the party committee. The regimental staff prepared and conducted a number of highly useful demonstrations for all battalion and company commanders with the help of the best subunits--the battalion commanded by Guards Major V. Kistenev and the company having Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Yeremenko as its commander.

All of this made it possible to eliminate the shortcomings revealed during the exercise in short time. The regiment had the best results for the training year in the group of forces, and it earned the challenge Red Banner of the Military Council of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The regiment's personnel were the first in the group of forces to support the initiators of the socialist competition in the ground forces, and they are fully resolved to welcome the 26th CPSU Congress honorably.

The combat readiness of the subunits and the unity of the military collectives, communists speaking at the conference emphasized, depend in many ways on the responsibility officers show in their attitude toward their work, on their knowledge of their responsibilities, and on the personal example they display in everything. In fact, can we really count on success in a subunit if its commander is inadequately prepared in tactical and technical respects? Can there be firm order in a subunit if the officers are themselves guilty of violations and condone deviations from the requirements of the manuals?

One speaker noted that in addition to leading subunits, the division does have not only "run-of-the-mill" subunits but also lagging ones. Some subunits failed to satisfy their pledges last year. This includes the antiaircraft battery commanded by Guards Captain P. Shchasnyy. The battery commander's name also came up in another example concerning the tactical competency of officers. In one of the exercises he had been unable to evaluate the situation and make a correct decision in the conditions of a dynamic modern battle.

Everything is interrelated: The commander was lacking in knowledge and abilities, and this had an effect on the training level of the antiaircraft gunners. It might be argued that he did attend the commander training and special tactical drills punctually throughout the year. This would mean, then, that the commander training drills had been planned and organized without a consideration for the greater requirements, and that he himself failed to relate responsibly to them.

In both cases we observe an absence of the necessary attention on the part of the unit commander, the staff, and the party committee to the officer's professional growth. As was emphasized at the conference, including in the statements made by Guards majors P. Savchuk and V. Petruk, the proper conclusions must be made from these facts not only by communist leaders but also by the party committee and the bureau, which still assume a passive position at times in regard to upgrading training quality and condone simplifications and laxity in the organization of commander training and of the training process as a whole.

The following question naturally arises: What should be the focus of the effort of, for example, the party committee and its secretary in the fight against simplifications in the case where the training process is organized by the commander and the staff? They must focus on nurturing the personal responsibility of communist officers for their assigned work, and on raising the efficiency of the personnel, on the mutual exactingness of the communists. But before they can do this, the active party members must themselves be competent in military affairs. Going out into the field, the party committee secretary must not only observe what is going on, but he must also be able to objectively evaluate the actions of the subunit and encourage the communists to eliminate laxity in the drills.

A report given by party commission secretary Guards Lieutenant S. Sadovskiy and statements made by a number of communists offer sharp criticism of certain party members and candidates who ignored their party duty. As a rule, such errors not only reduce morale but also have a sharply unfavorable effect on the course of service and combat training. Guards Major M. Fabritsiy was singled out in particular. He had been appointed an umpire in an exercise in which a neighboring regiment was to participate. Rather than teaching the subunit commanders how to respond to an unexpectedly changing situation, Fabritsiy simply revealed the intent of the staff.

This officer was strictly punished by his immediate supervisor. But the unit party organization failed to react to the communist's mistake; it could not recognize the harm that it did to combat training.

The party conference turned the attention of all of the formation's communists to the impermissibility of such a liberal approach to the life position of an

officer, emphasizing that it does harm not only to the morale in the collectives but also to combat readiness as a whole.

In the new training year the personnel of the division are fully resolved to achieve high results in competitive combat. As was emphasized in their statements by communists division commander Guards Colonel A. Vobrikov, company commander Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Bumber, and other comrades, much in the attainment of this goal will depend on organization and on a creative attitude toward the affairs of the officer complement. Considering the aggravated international situation, their efforts at raising combat readiness, their occupational skill, and their organizational abilities are acquiring even greater significance. It is important for every commander, political worker, and staff officer to be confident tacticians in modern combat, to understand the equipment and armament, and to serve as an example of discipline and of high political maturity. It is on this that the main efforts of the political section, party committees, and bureau, and of all party organizations will be directed.

Role of Communist in Armed Forces

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Correspondent Maj G. Barnev: "Authority in the Masses"]

[Text] The following phrase can often be heard in the Guards artillery regiment: "We need to get the advice of the party committee." It is uttered whenever a new initiative is born or a new agitation-propaganda measure is conceived, or when the question as to how to best resolve a particular delicate situation or conflict comes up. It is uttered with the confidence that the party committee will definitely take the time to think the problem out, discuss it conscientiously, and give a helping hand.

Literally everyone knows the path to the party committee here. People go there in regard to the most diverse issues. Here are just a few notes from the notebook of the party committee secretary, written by him not long before the election meeting.

"I was visited by Lieutenant A. Kolchev, chief of the medical aid station. He suggested giving a cycle of talks on medical topics to the personnel. We decided to include some of his proposed talks in the work plan of the agitprop group.

"Warrant Officer N. Tovstoluzhskiy, commander of an armament and optical instrument repair platoon, came by. He described an efficiency proposal which he had developed jointly with senior gun specialist Private 1st Class A. Bol'shakov. He appealed for its swift introduction. The committee must help him out, but it must simultaneously find out how things were going with introduction of other proposals by the regiment's efficiency experts."

There are also notes of another sort. One concerned the need for helping Warrant Officer V. Guslyayev to sign his daughter up for the nursery school. Another concerned the regiment collective's need for support in its amateur art.

It might seem that people sometimes bring their problems to completely the wrong place, and that by getting into their personal problems, the party committee assumes functions atypical of it. But Guards Major N. Naumov, the party committee secretary, believes differently. Furrowing his brow and stroking his hair, he said to me:

"I know that people sometimes go to the wrong place with their problems. But if a person comes to the party committee, do I have the right to say that it's none of my business? If people come to the party committee, this must mean that they trust us. This has nothing at all to do with my own personality. It boils down to the fact that people view the party committee and the regimental party organization as an authoritative and influential force. And I must not shake this confidence with a rash decision or a hasty act."

What makes up the authority of the party organization in the eyes of the collective? First of all there is the authority of its members. They all make up its "countenance", and this means that each of them makes his mark. It is very important to understand this. Does the communist serve as an example in combat training, is he in the lead among the competitors, does he have an active life position, does he show himself to be an ideological warrior of the party, is he always tactful toward people? These were the questions that were at the focus of attention at the election meeting, and the subject of constant concern and application of the main efforts of the party committee and all party organizations and party groups in the unit in the period of accountability.

Both the secretary's report and statements made by the communists made constant references to the deeds and efficiency of the candidates. Much in fact has been done in the regiment. Problems of combat training and discipline are being solved successfully, the military post's services are being broadened, and the training material base is being improved--the party organization actively helps the commander with all of this, and every pursuit embodies the thoughts and energy of the communists. Typically the party organization acts in accordance with methods inherent to its make-up: through the responsibility of communists for their work, development of their initiative, their personal example in training, service, and indoctrination, their ability to efficiently generalize and disseminate the experience of the socialist competition leaders, and the best teaching methods. Communist officers V. Glymbotskiy, N. Korenev, V. Gerter, and V. Martynov, Warrant Officer N. Tovstoluzhskiy, and many other subunit commanders that earned the "outstanding" title were respectfully singled out at the meeting.

There was also a frank discussion of shortcomings. As an example the communists spoke critically about the unworthy behavior of Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Sazonov, without sparing the comrade's ego. Sometimes he drinks a little too much, violates military discipline, and soils the honor of a communist. Criticism was levied against certain officers who got carried away with eloquence, forgetting that a communist's words carry weight only if they are reinforced by deeds, by initiative, and by active participation in organizational efforts. Speaking at the meeting, Guards Major A. Stepanov announced serious complaints in this respect against party member Officer N. Timokhin. The communist's official position requires him to deal with the problems of rear services. Naturally, when speaking at meetings he often argues in behalf of, for example, more-purposeful effort in

explaining the problems of economy and thrift to the personnel. But for some reason he feels that this is as far as his responsibility goes--simply attracting attention to the problem, and that the solution is someone else's business. Such explanations, he would argue, are the problems of the political workers. However, as was correctly emphasized at the meeting, a communist and, all the more so, a communist leader can keep control and retain authority if they organize people, raise their awareness, and awaken their energy, initiative, and persistence in surmounting difficulties not from one incident to the next, but every day.

The following incident was described at the meeting. Two artillery battalions experiencing approximately equal conditions and staffed with knowledgeable officers, warrant officers, and sergeants had highly differing results in their combat training. Why? Naturally the answer could not be simple. Figures describing the activity of party work in these subunits were cited. They eloquently revealed that communists in the first battalion held more talks with the soldiers, that they regularly participated in the indoctrination measures of the Komsomol organization, and that they concretely helped the active Komsomol members. The pattern in the second division was quite different. Would this not be one of the reasons why the successes enjoyed in combat training differ? After all, active communication with people not only permits purposeful influence upon subordinates, which is by itself important, but also affords the commander and party organization the possibilities to predict, to look into the future, to notice and correct shortcomings in time.

The soldiers received preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress as something close to their hearts, and they actively joined the socialist competition for an honorable welcome to the congress, adopting stiff pledges. It is noteworthy that the idea of examining their pledges with an eye on enlarging them was born in the masses on the initiative of the soldiers themselves. But it is also obviously natural that this patriotic initiative arose namely as a response to the initiative of the communists. Speaking at the election meeting, CPSU candidate Private 1st Class N. Gavrilov described in very great detail how all of this happened:

"In the morning we attended a political briefing in which it was stated that the party congress was to be convened in February. We learned that the communists were planning to achieve higher goals in the competition in honor of the congress. During a break between lessons Private Rakhimov came up to me. Komsomol group organizer, he said, I would like to reexamine my pledges. Please put me down for another pledge--I wish to become an outstanding soldier. He was immediately followed by other Komsomol members: Private Frolovskiy, Tovstogin, and others. In a word, 23 of the platoon's soldiers are now fighting for the 'outstanding' title."

The party committee devoted persistent attention in the period of accountability to strengthening the authority of the party organization and to making its work more visible. This was promoted by open party meetings held with a focus on the responsibility held by communists for party membership, and by open party candidate meetings, in which nonmembers took a most active part in the discussion of the candidates, delved into the concerns of the communists, and expressed their desire to march in step with the best. A young communist school was active in the regiment during this period. The lecture series "Discussions on the Party" enjoys

great popularity. The practice of informing the personnel of party meeting decisions is gaining increasingly greater acceptance.

Preparing for the election meeting, members of the party committee recognized that all personnel would be interested in the results. After all, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the October Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "The reports of the party committees to the communists are essentially reports to all laborers...."

The election meeting demonstrated that the high authority enjoyed by the regiment's party organization among the servicemen is based on its close ties with the masses, on its ability to inspire and support the initiative of the people, to concentrate their efforts on the key issues, and to follow through on its plan to the end, until a practical result is achieved. And of course, on the moral example of the communists. Here are typical cases.

Warrant Officer N. Tovstoluzhskiy's efficiency proposal was approved, and its introduction was started. But the communist refused to accept the inventor's certificate. He instructed that it should be given to Private 1st Class Bol'shakov. This is the reason he gave: "It was my idea, but he did everything else."

Here is another example: Once the unit received a mysterious postcard from the village of Poboishche in the Bashkir ASSR, written by Vitya Maksimov, a student in grade 6B. "This is to report, Comrade Private 1st Class, that I have quit smoking and that when I join the army, I will also be a private 1st class." For a long time the addressee remained unknown. There were many Gavrilov's in the unit, and the author of the note did not think to include the individual's initials. In the end, however, he was found. It was CPSU party candidate Private 1st Class N. Gavrilov, who had taught history at the school in Poboishche not that long ago. Vitya was a difficult student. The young teacher applied a great deal of effort to steer him away from his bad habits. And on joining the army, he continued to offer support to the child.

These details come to mind, and the countenance of the unit's communists becomes meaningful and attractive. The components of the high moral and official authority they hold in the eyes of the soldier masses become understandable. One cannot but respect a person who is deeply concerned about both what his regiment will be like tomorrow and what will happen in the future to a boy called Vitya in a distant Bashkir village.

Role of Party in Personal Life

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Isemgulov, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "And Once Again, 'Thanks for the Criticism...'"]

[Text] Familiar names--Major Limov, and in connection with him, Lieutenant Dombik--were once again heard at an election meeting held by our political section's party organization. These names came up because throughout the year, our comrades had to talk with both one and the other many times, and not only talk but also take part in analyzing their personal affairs.

Major Ye. Limov was appointed commander of a separate battalion a year and a half ago. His application for the position stated that he knew his stuff, that he was an energetic, principled person, that he knew how to deal with subordinates, and that he related to criticism and self-criticism in party style. It was discovered at this time that even then, some workers of the personnel organ had doubts about Comrade Limov's candidacy. Nevertheless the order appointing him was published.

A little time later, deputy commander for political affairs Major P. Snytko had this to say in a talk with a worker of the political section:

"Comrade Limov is hitting the sauce more than he should. And rather often. I warned him, and he repented. O.K. Petr Ivanovich, he said, I won't do it any more. I'll get back to work and put things in order in the battalion."

"And so? Did he?"

"No. He's still saucing it up...."

Colonel V. Alyekhintsev, chief of the political section for special units of the Alma-Ata garrison, invited Major Limov for a talk. The latter openly confessed everything, and he vowed:

"It won't happen again!"

But alas....

I'm not going into all of the details of this troublesome incident just to tell the reader what sort of officer this is. His story gives us serious food for thought on the merit of a communist, his life position, and selection of personnel for important positions.

There is a category of people (unfortunately they even include party members) who cannot be reproached for not turning their attention to criticism, though this is in fact what they do. They react to reprimands with the greatest intentions, at least outwardly. Moreover even when answering such reprimands at party meetings, they often begin with the words:

"Thank you very much, comrades, for the criticism. I feel it to be totally justified...."

This is also approximately what Major Limov said when he heard Major V. Mostovoy's impartial opinion of his behavior during a party meeting.

Such people quickly admit all mistakes and immediately promise to set things straight, much in the manner of the sovkhoz director in Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's book "Virgin Soil", who always answered reprimands with "I'm sorry". Communist Limov behaved very similarly in February of this year when he was first put on the carpet in a meeting of our political section's party commission.

I must admit that behavior of this sort in response to reprimands does produce a certain impression on others: The individual has understood his mistakes, he has

accepted the criticism correctly, and this means that he has assumed a road of rehabilitation. And so, do we really need to punish him harshly?

Admission of error and profuse assurances of doing things right in the future makes such a person almost invulnerable at first. This apparent invulnerability allows him--and not without grounds--to count on having everything turn out well in the future. Thus he need not alter his accustomed way of life in any way, or exert himself to fulfill his promises.

Such a position is much more dangerous when it is taken by a communist leader. There is something we call authority of position. That is, before an officer even has a chance to prove himself, by his simple assumption of a particular post he immediately acquires a concrete degree of official respect on the part of subordinates. People validly think that there was reason for his appointment, that he must have done something to earn the position. Their disenchantment is all the more bitter when they suddenly discover that their leader is not worthy of the authority of his position, as was the case with Major Limov. At first, even he was perceived by some as a pleasant person in many respects: He was always available, and he had a sense of humor. Some officers, especially young ones, were taken in by this purely external charm. Among them was the Komsomol committee secretary, Lieutenant Dombik. One can imagine a situation in which a young officer is addressed by his chief on a first-name basis.

"Let's sneak out for a pint, O.K.?"

The other was probably flattered by the invitation. Moreover it is also hard to refuse.

Lieutenant Dombik is generally not a bad officer. He shows initiative, but his character is still a little weak. Once he did try to refuse one of the invitations, saying that the personnel (meaning all Komsomol members as well) were participating in a drill and that he had to be there as well.

"I can't be doing this any more," he said at that time.

"You're safe with me. I'll cover for you all the way...."

Naturally, the senior officer's behavior could not but have an effect, and primarily on the collective's morale. And this, naturally, also influenced the state of affairs in the battalion and the way certain officers related to their work. Relationships between people began to deteriorate as well. Some, like Lieutenant Dombik, were "teacher's pets". Others who expressed displeasure with communist Limov's personal behavior found themselves among the "pariahs". Party bureau secretary Captain S. Ogloblin tried to influence him through both frequent talks and criticism in party meetings. Limov at first agreed with the secretary with a certain amount of condescension, and later on he stopped paying attention to him altogether. He willfully absented himself from certain party functions. He answered the secretary's questions without going into details: "I was busy." Moreover he did not even make the election meeting of the party organization of the directorate to which he was assigned.

The following question might naturally arise: What was the political section doing when Limov was appointed to such an important post? Did this really happen without adequate examination of his working, political, and moral qualities? Limov was appointed on the basis of a recommendation of a superior chief without considering the political organ's opinion. It is now difficult to establish the motives of such a decision, because that chief had been transferred to another place of service. Perhaps personal sympathies or other causes invisible to the incidental observer played a role. Limov had a knack for greeting guests, especially from higher up, and he knew how to give them a good time. In his case a year and a half after this, a situation which is now referred to as a "mistake in personnel selection" arose.

Everyone knows the requirements the party imposes on the selection and placement of personnel and on their moral countenance. They were emphasized once again at the 25th CPSU Congress and in subsequent plenums of the Central Committee. Today, in a time when the party is reviewing its forces before the congress, we must once again critically examine ourselves and the deeds of each party organization, and each communist: What are we doing to implement the party's requirements?

I think that our political organ has given Comrade Limov too much benefit of the doubt, limiting itself to admonitions and advice. Believing in his repentance and assurances, the party commission was very soft on him.

Speaking at the November (1979) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev had this to say about such workers: "No matter how much you talk to them, no matter how much you appeal to their conscience, to their sense of duty and responsibility, nothing seems to help. At such times you must act more decisively, you must take other steps, you must replace those who do not do their job...."

A party commission organized to deal with Communist Limov met once again; once again he admitted all his mistakes, and once again he promised to mend his ways. But this time the old formula did not work. He was given a harsh party reprimand. The issue as to whether or not he was to remain in his official position was also raised in the political section.

Major Limov no longer commands the separate battalion.

Follow-Up Report on Party Criticism

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jan 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] "And Once Again, 'Thanks for the Criticism....'". This was the title of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel A. Isengulov, published on 21 November 1980, in which he discussed the unprincipled attitude assumed by certain officials in response to criticism. While agreeing with criticism directed towards them and promising to correct their shortcomings, they do in fact change nothing in the style of their work. In particular, these shortcomings were typical of Major Ye. Limov.

According to Colonel N. Pobozhenko, deputy chief of the political directorate of the Central Asian Military District, the facts in the letter were fully confirmed. Major Ye. Limov was dismissed from his post for his negligence of his duties and unworthy personal behavior. A harsh written reprimand was placed in his personal file by decision of a party commission under the political section for special units of the Alma-Ata garrison.

Lieutenant O. Dombik was dismissed from his post as Komsomol committee secretary and placed on party probation.

In a meeting of the district's political directorate, the attention of commanders, political workers, and party organization secretaries was turned to the need for carefully selecting, placing, and indoctrinating officers and for having political organs and party organizations take a more active part in this work, and concrete steps to eliminate the shortcomings were planned.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Oct 80 pp 2-3

[Article by Dr Hist Sci, Prof A. Akhtamzyan: "A Principled, Class Policy"]

[Text] As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in his speech at the celebrations in Alma-Ata, a political struggle is now going on in the world between forces fighting for peace, respect of the rights of peoples, and detente on one hand and the forces of oppression, militarism, and aggression on the other. This struggle between two basic directions in international policy is proceeding continuously, on a global scale, and in the most diverse forms. The forces actively pursuing the first direction include the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the international communist and workers movement, and the national movement of liberation against colonialism and imperialism. The second direction is represented by reactionary monopolist circles and the military-industrial complexes of the capitalist countries, mainly the United States of America.

The present political situation is unique in that the international situation has recently become significantly more complex and acute. The USA and its NATO allies are to blame for this. In order to retard the objective process of the world's renewal and to resurrect the cold war, they have assumed a course of dictatorship, compulsion, and confrontation in international affairs. In a desire to insure military supremacy for themselves over the socialist fraternity, and in response to events and changes in the world disadvantageous to them, they have initiated a new, dangerous spiral in the arms race.

The U.S. administration's orientation toward possible nuclear war, and not toward its prevention, and attempts at making a nuclear conflict probable and acceptable in the minds of people are especially dangerous. This is essentially the main goal of the so-called "new nuclear strategy" recently declared by the U.S. government. But talk of the possibility of "limited", "partial", "controlled" use of a nuclear weapon is nothing more than monstrous deception of the public, since any such use may elicit a worldwide thermonuclear war.

The strengthening partnership of U.S. imperialists and Beijing's leaders, who are pursuing a course of increasing international tension in behalf of their big-power hegemonist designs, is having a negative influence on international relations. As we know, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Deputy Chairman Deng Xiaoping has declared many times that "a third world war of enormous proportions is inevitable" and that "it would not be as bad as all that."

In this complex international situation, our Communist Party and the Soviet government are displaying restraint, firmness, and adherence to principles as they consistently implement Lenin's policy of peace and follow the course, charted by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, toward insuring the security of the Soviet people and the peoples of the socialist fraternity, and toward consolidating international security in general.

As is documented in our constitution, the USSR's foreign policy is aimed at supporting international conditions favoring development of communism in the USSR, defense of the state interests of the Soviet Union, reinforcement of the positions of world socialism, support of the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, deterrence of aggressive wars, attainment of universal and total disarmament, and successive implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures.

The Soviet state's foreign policy is a class policy, a deeply internationalist policy. It reflects the revolutionary ideals and fundamental vital interests of the Soviet people and the peoples of other countries in the socialist fraternity and of all laborers on earth. It is a deeply humanitarian policy. It is aimed at preserving and consolidating peace, deterring aggressive wars, relaxing international tension, and ridding mankind of the yoke of the arms race. Peace is the greatest blessing of all peoples, and an important prerequisite of all of mankind's progress. "In our days," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "there can be no foreign policy that is more moral in the best sense of this word, and closer to the hearts and wisdom of the people than a policy of peace, detente, and control of the arms race."

This is precisely the nature of Soviet foreign policy. Its principled and humanitarian nature revealed itself once again in its entirety in the period between the 25th and 26th CPSU congresses.

The second half of the 1970's was marked by active and purposeful foreign policy activity by the party and its Leninist Central Committee.

As in former times, the Soviet Union devoted priority attention to strengthening friendship and deepening full cooperation with socialist countries. The Central Committee and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee devote constant attention to reinforcing unity and developing cooperation with fraternal countries in the political, economic, ideological, and international areas. These issues are examined at Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's meetings with the leaders of the fraternal countries in the Crimea, meetings which have become traditional.

We can note with satisfaction today that equitable, mutually advantageous economic cooperation among socialist states has broadened, and the effectiveness of their national economic ties and socialist division of labor has risen. A course of socialist economic integration within the framework of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance is being consistently followed.

The achievements of the CEMA countries are universally recognized today. They surpass those of the Common Market countries and the USA together in regard to petroleum and iron ore extraction and lumber, sugar, and mineral fertilizer production. They surpass Common Market members in electric power production by 1.3

times, coal production by 3 times, fuel production by 1.5 times, cement production by 1.4 times, and woolen fabrics by 1.3 times. CEMA's activities are promoting gradual convergence and equalization of the levels of economic development of council members, and intensification of their influence on world development.

As the 1980 Crimean conference once again confirmed, the fraternal socialist countries place the interests of preserving and consolidating peace and confirming the rights of all peoples for free and independent development at the pinnacle of their coordinated foreign policy. The main objectives of the foreign policy of countries in the socialist fraternity are to advance relaxation of tension, supplement it with steps at military relaxation, achieve a real turning point in the arms race toward disarmament, and promote just, political resolution of conflicts.

At the same time the fraternal parties and states are strengthening their defensive military alliance. The Warsaw Pact, the 25th anniversary of which was celebrated this year by countries of the socialist fraternity, is dependably insuring the security of its member states, and it is serving as an important factor of universal security.

Growth in cooperation with developing countries and with peoples struggling for national and social liberation and against colonialism and its vestiges is an important direction in the foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The Soviet Union and other states of the socialist fraternity support the valid struggle of nations for their liberation, they take the side of the forces of progress, democracy, and national independence, and they deal with them as they would their natural allies in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Faithful to V. I. Lenin's commandments and their internationalist duty, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity actively support the desire of peoples liberated from the colonial yoke to strengthen their political and economic independence and finally rid themselves of imperialist exploitation. More than 3,000 facilities have been built and about another 1,400 are being built or will be built in liberated countries with the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other CEMA members. In India, for example, up to 35 percent of the steel and up to 80 percent of metallurgical equipment is being produced by enterprises built with the assistance of the Soviet Union; these enterprises are also credited with more than half of the petroleum extraction volume and a third of the refining volume.

While the imperialists try to retrieve lost positions in a liberated country by armed force, the Soviet Union, being a true friend, tries to help its people in the struggle against imperialist aggression. Thus it is at request of the government of Afghanistan and in full correspondence with the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation, that our country is providing effective military support to the Afghan people in repelling aggression organized by the ruling circles of the USA and the Beijing hegemonists.

Our party is also applying unweakening effort in another strategic direction of foreign policy--development of relations with capitalist countries. What has been and continues to be most important here is the struggle for affirmation of the

principles of peaceful coexistence, for a sound peace, and for relaxation and, in the future, elimination of the danger of a new world war.

Owing to the multifaceted activities of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity, and owing to their consistent struggle for peace and international security, in the 1970's we were able to significantly improve the international climate and create favorable prerequisites for resolving debates and international conflicts. In the course of relaxation, peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures has affirmed itself and filled itself with a concrete economic and political content.

In today's conditions, where at the fault of aggressive imperialist circles of the USA and its NATO allies the international situation has become noticeably more aggravated and remains complex, the foreign policy activities of our party and its Leninist Central Committee is aimed at preserving detente and all good things the 1970's had to offer, achieving a turning point in disarmament, and preserving and consolidating the peace. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity favor continuation and deepening of political dialog between states belonging to different social systems. They declare that there are no problems in Europe, in Asia, and in other parts of the world which the socialist countries would not be ready to resolve at the negotiating table.

A number of initiatives of just last year attest to the persistent, purposeful, and consistent struggle of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity for peace and international security.

They include a proposal, suggested in a conference of the CEMA Political Consultative Committee, for summit talks among the leaders of countries in all regions of the world to discuss problems associated with eliminating centers of international tension and preventing war.

There was the USSR initiative concerning negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and concurrently on American forward-based resources.

There was the proposal by socialist countries at the Vienna talks foreseeing, among other recommended steps, reduction of forces totaling 13,000 U.S. servicemen and 20,000 Soviet servicemen, above and beyond the Soviet military contingent which was withdrawn by the Soviet Union from the GDR on a unilateral basis.

There was the Soviet Union's proposal for including, in the agenda of the presently convened 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, the issue "On Some Immediate Measures to Reduce Military Danger", and the memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guaranteeing International Security" submitted to this session by the Soviet Union.

Displaying concern for strengthening international security, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries attach especially important significance to achieving military relaxation mainly in Europe, where the largest troop groupings of the opposing military alliances are concentrated. They consistently favor implementation of all provisions of the European Conference's Concluding Document. They

are applying considerable effort to get negotiations on reducing armed forces and arms in Central Europe, which have now been going on in Vienna for 7 years already, out of their dead end.

The immediate path of the foreign policy of the USSR and other fraternal socialist countries is to sponsor, and conduct with substantial results, a meeting of representatives of the European Conference in Madrid, and insure convocation of a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe. "What is most important," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasizes, "is to find the way to reduce the military threat today and in the future in Europe, and consequently, in all the world."

The Soviet Union also favors universal political resolution of the situation in the Near and Middle East, and stabilization of the position in Southeast Asia. Our people resolutely condemn the aggressive actions and military demonstrations of the imperialists of the USA and the Beijing hegemonists in relation to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, and Democratic Kampuchea. The USSR is working to terminate imperialist aggression against Afghanistan, and it is expressing its support to negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for resolution of the conflict between Iraq and Iran.

The Soviet Union bases its foreign policy on the scientifically grounded conclusion and the humanitarian conviction that a worldwide nuclear missile war is not a fatalistic inevitability in the modern era, that war may be averted. But war cannot be averted spontaneously. The constant active efforts of peace-loving forces are needed.

In order to keep the nuclear fire from starting up, the Soviet Union is arguing in favor of negotiations to halt production of all types of nuclear weapons and to gradually reduce the nuclear weapon reserves down to their complete elimination. As before, the Soviet Union is ready to participate in the process of limiting and reducing strategic arms, with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security of the sides.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy is consistent and principled. It enjoys the support of the broadest popular masses in all the world. Naturally, this is not to the liking of the ruling circles of the imperialist states. They are trying to blacken this policy, to distort its goals. Spreading the conscious lie of a "Soviet military threat", the ideologists of imperialism assert that this threat supposedly emanates from our revolutionary ideology and our solidarity with the struggle of other peoples for liberty and progress.

Such assertions are nothing more than gross distortions of the truth. The experience of history has demonstrated that our adherence to social and national liberation of peoples has nothing in common with "export of revolution". First, every revolution is mainly the natural result of the internal differences experienced by the given society, and of social development of each specific country. Second, there is no contradiction between our struggle for relaxation of international tension and our solidarity with the peoples national liberation movement. Detente and peaceful coexistence have to do with international relations. They in no way supplant, and they cannot supplant or alter the laws of the class struggle.

Detente now has deep roots in modern international life, and as the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted in the decree "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union", there are real possibilities for preserving it as the dominant trend of world politics.

Detente is the natural result of the balance of forces that evolved in the world arena in the last few decades. The military-strategic equality that has been achieved between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is an achievement of fundamental historical significance. It is a factor restraining the aggressive desires of imperialism, which is in line with the fundamental interests of all nations. Any designs on shaking this balance are fated to fail.

The June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee ordered the Central Committee Politburo to steadfastly promote the course of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses in the present situation as well, at a time when the adventuristic actions of the USA and its accomplices are intensifying the military danger. This course is one of all-out reinforcement of the fraternal union of socialist states, of support of the just struggle of peoples for liberty and independence, of peaceful coexistence, of preservation and development of international detente, and of mutually profitable cooperation in economics, science, and culture. But the intrigues of imperialism and other enemies of peace demand constant alertness and all-out reinforcement of our state's defense capabilities, so as to foil imperialism's plan of achieving military superiority and enacting a world dictatorship.

As we can see, the firm will for peace and constant readiness to decisively repel aggression merge into a single whole in our party's policy. Waging a decisive, successive, principled struggle for peace, the CPSU and the Soviet government are showing constant concern for strengthening the country's defense capabilities and the fighting power and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. In their implementation of this peace-loving foreign policy, they are relying on the inviolable defense capability of the country, and the fighting power of the army and navy.

War as a means for resolving political problems is alien to socialism. From the point of view of domestic conditions, the Soviet state has no need for either an army or a military policy. But considering the constant military threat emanating from circles of the imperialist powers hostile to us, we are forced to defend ourselves. The security of our country and the security of our allies have never and will never be waived by the Soviet people. Our state spends for military purposes as much as is required to dependably protect the peaceful life of the Soviet people.

Fulfilling their historic mission of protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet Union and, together with fraternal armies, the entire fraternity of socialist states, the Soviet Armed Forces are at the same time the indestructible bulwark of universal peace and security of nations, a dependable means for restraining the aggressive intrigues of imperialism. The very fact of the existence of the powerful Soviet Army and Navy has a deterring action upon the proponents of international piracy and military adventures, preventing their attempts at turning the wheel of history backward.

As was once again persuasively confirmed by the proceedings and decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech

to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, all of the thoughts and all of the activities of our party and the Soviet people are aimed at developing the country's economy and completing great creative tasks. But if we are to achieve our high goals in the development of productive forces, the Soviet people need peace, and the country needs dependable security. This is why our party and the Soviet government will continue to consistently and steadfastly implement a policy of peace, detente, and neutralization of the forces of war and aggression.

Chinese-U.S. Relations Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Yu. Lugovskoy: "In a Conspiracy With Imperialism"]

[Text] The continuing process of Sino-American rapprochement is generating an increasing sense of concern in Asia, and quite justifiably. After all, it has long been clear now that this process is developing not within the mainstream of peaceful coexistence. The facts confirm with increasing emphasis that the mutual attraction of Washington and Beijing is contrary to the interests of peace and security in Asia, and not only there. It would perhaps have been difficult to expect anything else, considering what is really behind this phenomenon of political magnetism. Trying to justify its rapprochement with Beijing, the American press untiringly broadcasts a supposed process of "de-Maoization" in China. There is also talk of Beijing's turn to "pragmatism", which creates the impression that it promises a "softening" of China's foreign policy and rejection of the excesses of the "Cultural Revolution" which Beijing attempted to export into the neighboring countries of Asia.

This is a good time to recall the Chinese saying about the merchant who keeps a ram's head on the counter but sells dog meat. There are clearly no grounds for interpreting "de-Maoization" as rejection of the social-chauvinistic principles of Maoism by the present rulers in Beijing. True, Maoist doctrines are undergoing some modification, but this does not change the fundamental principles of Beijing's foreign policy course.

And in fact, no one has ever heard anything that might be implied as Beijing rejection of, for example, the Maoist thesis of the inevitability of a new world war. On the contrary they continue to prophesy "great upheavals in the land", tying them in with their maniacal designs for hegemony in world affairs. Hence follows the emphasis on militarization, camouflaged by the motto of the "four modernizations". Hence also follow the new manifestations of expansionism, which has assumed more-distorted, meticulously camouflaged but no-less-dangerous forms. Everything indicates that Sino-American rapprochement is the product of agreement in the tactical designs of Beijing and Washington in geopolitical aspects.

We know that Asia occupies a special place in Beijing's plans. And therefore it is no surprise that the negative influence of Chinese policy is mainly affecting this continent, and affecting it with greater intensity as pro-imperialist trends reveal themselves within it.

It has been a long time since Beijing has recalled the slogan of the struggle against the "two superpowers". Instead, the Soviet Union is called "enemy No 1". Beijing does have other "enemies" as well. Among them are the many countries bordering on China and engaged in the national liberation movement. Such a striking metamorphosis occurred in the posture of Beijing rulers toward the second "superpower", namely the United States, that in the words of a certain American newspaper, it struck some people in Washington dumbfounded.

Beijing has added the USA to the list of its potential allies. Today it is openly aligning itself with imperialist circles toward which it had addressed "serious warnings" not at all that long ago. This is evidenced by establishment of direct military ties between China and the USA, which are acquiring the distinct earmarks of an alliance, to which Japan is also stubbornly being invited. Such contacts in the military area are enjoying swift development.

On its side, rejecting the former balanced approach in its relations with China and the Soviet Union, the USA is openly counting on imparting a "strategic character" to its ties with Beijing. This is expressing itself in two ways. First, Washington has lifted many restrictions on supplying arms and technology with military applications to China. After a delegation headed by Gen Biao visited the USA in May-June of this year, the White House approved, for example, export licenses permitting delivery of radar equipment, C-130 military transport aircraft, helicopters, jet engine testing stands, and computers to China. A subsequent visit to China in September by a Pentagon delegation headed by U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary W. Perry was made with the purpose of practical implementation of the Sino-American agreement on military deliveries.

Responding to Carter's lead, the USA's NATO allies are also opening their arsenals to the Chinese. Second, as was noted in the American President's "State of the Union" message, the USA "had broadened new relations with the Chinese People's Republic to insure that wherever our interests are compatible, the actions we undertake independently of one another would be mutually complementary."

This is completely to the liking of Beijing, which readily accepted this statement as a certain guideline for action. I am referring not only to parallel actions by the USA and China. In a number of cases these parallels have already converged.

In what ways do the interests of the new partners agree, where do they manifest themselves, and what is their danger to peace and liberty of Asian peoples? These areas of agreement can be readily deduced from Washington's and Beijing's sabotage of disarmament measures, from their opposition to the spread of detente in Asia, from their common interest in creating centers of tension in Asia, and from their forced military preparations. The evaluations made by Beijing and Washington of the situation in different regions of Asia agree as well.

It has been noted many times by Pentagon chief H. Brown that the Chinese leaders are "understanding" of Washington's extraordinary measures in the Near East, and of its efforts "in defense matters" in the Pacific and Indian oceans. And in fact, Beijing openly approves the Pentagon's construction of bases along the entire perimeter of the Asian continent. It also clearly encourages concentration of the American fleet in the Persian Gulf and transfer of subunits of the "fast reaction" corps to Asia.

The July meeting between Hua Guofeng and Carter in Tokyo once again confirmed that the Chinese leadership favors strengthening the Japanese-American military alliance, and that it is pushing Japan into forced militarization. Appealing for the creation of something labeled as a broad "antihegemonist front", the Beijing rulers obviously believe that with time, they will be able to include it within the composition of a Japanese-American security agreement.

Indulging the military preparations of the Pentagon in Asia, Beijing is pursuing its own self-interested goals. It wants to capitalize on the contradictions existing between imperialism and the national liberation movement. And mainly, it wants to utilize the arising complications as a means for implementing its expansionist plans. In other words it wants to make a back-stage deal with Washington in relation to sharing "spheres of vital interest" in Asia.

The land of China's neighbors is known to be an object of special desire for the modern Mandarins in Beijing. These aspirations have become even more brazen and provocative since Deng Xiaoping's visit to the USA. The aggressive attack upon the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is not the sole example of this. Beijing's subversive activities against India and Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and other countries of Asia have expanded noticeably. The fact that during the same period Beijing activated its diplomatic channels in Asia does not change the essence of the matter: According to the strategy of "two-level diplomacy" publicly explained by Deng Xiaoping, support of official relations with an Asian country permits Beijing to concurrently interfere in its internal affairs, providing support to various separatists and rebels attempting to destabilize existing regimes.

The latest events have shown that the actions of Washington and Beijing are not only "mutually complementary" but are directly coordinated by both sides, as can be seen from Hua Guofeng's meeting with Carter in Tokyo. Such united application of efforts can be observed today in Southwest and Southeast Asia. Many facts confirm that the USA and China have reached agreement on coordinated subversive activities against democratic Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan. Such "division of labor" is also being set up in Thailand in relation to subversive activities against neighboring socialist countries- Kampuchea and Laos.

Moreover Beijing quite often grants its support to subversive elements in Asian countries which had been formerly given the blessing of the American CIA. We can cite, as examples, the chiefs of the Afghan counterrevolutionary emigrants who have based themselves in the north of Pakistan, separatists of the Naga and Mizo tribal groups in India, Shan, Karen, and other rebels in Burma, the Lao "Black General" (Vang Pao), and the like.

Weapons travel in a constant flow from China along the Karakorum Road through part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan. This road is being actively used by China and the USA in their undeclared war against Afghanistan and India, conducted from Pakistani territory. Plans for building new lateral supply roads in the mountains of Karakorum are being suggested. It has become known that the intelligence services of the USA and China, as well as of England and Pakistan are performing the joint operation "Karakorum-80" for this purpose. Its objective, as was noted by Indian newspapers, is to find areas in the mountains of Karakorum to deploy electronic equipment intended to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and

India. The operation "Karakorum-80", noted the newspaper PATRIOT, is more evidence of the attempt to transform Pakistan into an Asian outpost of the USA and China.

Beijing has also chosen other neighboring countries as the targets of its intrigues. Nine out of 11 neighboring countries are on the list of China's territorial aspirations. Observers in Asian countries estimate that since World War II, Beijing has provoked at least as many military conflicts in Asia as has imperialism. Partnership with the USA is permitting Beijing to intensify its aggressive overtures in Asia, and consequently its threat is growing.

On the other hand Beijing's collusion with imperialism affords the latter additional possibilities for fighting the national liberation movement. After all, many Asian countries are now forced to fight on two fronts for practical purposes. This is why we hear appeals for alertness in Asia in relation to the common intrigues of the American and Chinese enemies of the national liberation movement.

Army General Discusses Disarmament

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Dec 80 p 3

[Interview with Army Gen S. Akhromeyev by V. Morozov: "Military Relaxation--the Will of the Times"]

[Text] V. Morozov, a military reviewer of the "Novosti" Press Agency, met with USSR Armed Forces 1st Deputy Chief of General Staff, Army General S. Akhromeyev, and asked him to reply to some questions concerning military relaxation.

Question: A meeting of representatives from the member states of the European Conference was opened on 11 November in Madrid. As we know, its purpose was to prepare a foundation for convening a special conference on military relaxation and disarmament in Europe. What, in your opinion, made such a conference necessary?

Answer: Two circumstances made it necessary. First there is the arms race, into which the USA has drawn in all of the NATO states as well as its allies outside this bloc. It has now assumed an extremely dangerous scale. According to UN estimates the total power contained in the nuclear weapon arsenals of all countries possessing such weapons exceeds 50 billion tons of "conventional" explosive. In the event of their use, these weapons could annihilate all life on earth many times over.

The USA and NATO have started implementing new multibillion dollar programs of further deployment of strategic weapons: MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, new Trident atomic submarines and ballistic missiles for them, long-range cruise missiles of various types, and new heavy bombers. Concurrently the NATO countries are designing new tactical warplanes, tanks, and so on. An entire series of such weapon systems will be designed in the near future, signifying both quantitative and qualitative growth in military power.

The socialist countries have persistently urged the West several times to put a halt to and table various sorts of programs for creation of new weapon systems. However,

the proposals of the socialist countries are not supported by the USA and other NATO countries. The issue today can essentially be stated as follows: Either put an end to these programs and begin negotiations to limit and reduce arms with a consideration for the interests of the sides and their equal security, or if the USA does not go along with this, begin the arms race anew--with a cost to mankind that would even be difficult to predict.

Second, there is the alarming situation evolving in Europe. Since the time the Helsinki Agreement was signed, negative trends in development of the military-political situation on the European continent have grown dangerously at the fault of imperialist forces. Reactionary circles of the USA and NATO countries do not wish to accept the realities of our times, such as the need for a balance of power insuring equal security for all states. They are attempting to upset the approximate equality of forces that has evolved in Europe and contiguous regions at any cost and by all means available, up to and including the threat of nuclear war; they are attempting to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact, and then dictate their conditions to the pact "from a position of strength".

These are precisely the goals sought in the decision, imposed by the United States upon some NATO countries, to deploy almost 600 new American medium-range nuclear missiles in West Europe. What we are actually talking about here is a qualitative and quantitative change in the balance of military forces in Europe as a whole in favor of the USA and NATO. Creation of a "Eurostrategic" nuclear potential insures an advantage for the USA in that new Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles deployed near the borders of the socialist countries could be used in an anticipatory strike. This would place the USSR in an extremely disadvantageous and dangerous situation in relation to the United States, and significantly alter the strategic situation in both Europe and the entire world. The Soviet Union cannot remain apathetic to this blatant military threat, since the December (1979) decision of the NATO council undermines the principle of equality and identical security of the sides, a principle which the USSR and the USA promised to follow in relation to one another, and because it promotes continuation of the arms race and sharply aggravates the international situation.

In the present complex situation, in which the dangerous trends of growing military opposition in Europe, persistently being encouraged by aggressive forces are making their impact felt with ever-greater intensity, the decision of the Madrid meeting to convene a conference on military relaxation and disarmament in Europe as quickly as possible may become an important contribution to developing the general process in Europe that was started in Helsinki.

Question: Are the plans for deploying more arms in Europe the only thing making military relaxation difficult?

Answer: Now, unfortunately, these plans are not the only thing. The USA's so-called "new nuclear strategy" elicits no less serious alarm. This strategy clearly expresses Washington's course toward intensification of its military potential and achievement of general military superiority over the Soviet Union. By its essence, the main emphasis is on preparing American strategic nuclear forces for an anticipatory surprise attack on military objectives in socialist countries. The USA openly declares its readiness and capability for interfering, at any time in the affairs of any region on the globe with both conventional and nuclear weapons.

Initiation of a preventive nuclear war is believed by the "creators" of this strategy to be a normal phenomenon, and the public is being asked to accept the criminal thought that "limited" or "partial" use of nuclear weapons is not all that terrible, since it would be not only acceptable but even "humanitarian", inasmuch as population losses would be minimized. "This policy is extremely dangerous to peoples of all the world!" said CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. "It is even difficult to imagine that it originates from the government of a country that signed a treaty with the Soviet Union to prevent nuclear war."

The USA is now forcefully imposing its nuclear strategy on its West European partners in the hope that the idea of making an anticipatory nuclear strike would be officially accepted by the NATO bloc.

Question: What concrete steps, besides convening the conference, are socialist countries proposing in the area of military relaxation?

Answer: The Soviet Union's principled approach to preserving peace and deepening relaxation is universally known. The socialist countries are doing everything they can to prevent growth in military opposition between the two groupings. Concrete examples of this are: a broad program of measures to halt unrestrained growth in nuclear missile potential, proposed by Warsaw Pact states in May of this year; withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks, and a large quantity of other military equipment from the GDR; new constructive proposals to reduce the level of military opposition in Central Europe at the Vienna talks, proposals which should have a favorable impact if the other side demonstrates good will, promoting solution of the problems under discussion on a mutually acceptable basis; constructive proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in the negotiations to limit nuclear arms in Europe, and many other initiatives.

If the Western countries really did want to insure peace, they would obviously not have made the negotiations so difficult, and instead they would be doing everything to see that the talks proceed in a constructive spirit, and effectively. But unfortunately this is not the case. Today, for example, more and more people in Washington favor "laying to rest", as Republican Senator J. Tower expressed it, the Soviet-American SALT-TWO Treaty, with the excuse that it is supposedly not equitable, and that it does not reflect the USA's national security interests.

What can we say about this? I cannot help recalling what President Carter said on 13 May 1979: "If after signing the SALT-TWO Treaty the USA were to refuse its ratification, it would take on the role of 'an instigator of war', since by doing so it would refuse participation in the joint attempt to limit the spread of the most destructive weapons mankind has ever known." Many remember this declaration, and nations will make the appropriate assessment of the actions of those who oppose the treaty, which has such vitally important significance to all mankind. The SALT-TWO Treaty was worked out in the course of 7 years with the participation of a Republican and a Democratic administration in the USA. It is based on a just consideration of the balance of power. Nothing in it can be changed in favor of one of the sides that signed it, since the other side would immediately react with a requirement in its favor. If a hope for gaining concessions from the Soviet Union at the expense of its security does exist, it does not have any substantial grounds beneath it.

Faithful to the peaceful course of our foreign policy, and to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Agreement, the Soviet Union decisively opposes the arms race and military adventures. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev recently announced: "We are for preserving detente, for deepening it, for peaceful, equitable cooperation between states. We threaten no one, we do not interfere in the affairs of other countries and peoples, and we have no intention of doing so. And we would like all other powers to do the same. We are for placing all of the mechanisms of peaceful and just resolution of international problems into action."

NATO Helicopter Use Viewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Cand Mil Sci, Col V. Babich based on foreign publications: "Helicopters Over the Battlefield"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a series of articles devoted to combat use of tactical airplanes by NATO countries. We would like the newspaper to describe the tactics of combat helicopters.

Captain V. Kozlov,
Senior Lieutenant V. Gusev,
Lieutenant V. Sergeyev,

Typical representatives of combat helicopters making up a significant part of the army aviation of the NATO countries are the AH-1G Cobra in the USA, the BO-105 (and its modification PAH-1) in the FRG, and the Lynx in England. The take-off weight of these helicopters does not exceed 4,700 kg, their top speed is 300 km/hr, and their practical ceiling is 5,200 meters. The crew consists of a pilot and one operator controlling fire weapons and missiles.

The basic tactics of army aviation were defined in the course of the USA's aggressive wars in Indochina: the combat formations, tactics insuring covert flight and surprise, and battlefield organization, control, and coordination. The following basic missions were given to combat helicopters: fire support to ground troops on the battlefield; escort of troop-carrying helicopters; preliminary softening of a tactical assault party's landing area; fire support to landing zones beyond the effective range of artillery; participation in fire reconnaissance; tank suppression, and so on.

The experience that has been accumulated in the performance of these missions is being used today to improve army aviation and its tactics in the NATO countries. However, experts recommend a critical approach to this experience. In the Near East conflict of 1973, the flatness of the Sinai Peninsula, absence of natural cover, and clear weather precluded the use of camouflage and deception, to which American interventionists attach great significance in South Vietnam.

Even when airborne aggression was transferred from South Vietnam to Laos, the Americans were forced to reject some of the troop fire support tactics they had developed. Here is what was written in this regard in NEWSWEEK: "That large-caliber machinegun and 37-mm antiaircraft gun emplacements had been set up in Southern Laos was a surprise.... Even helicopters flying at 750 meters were struck by the fire storm, while in South Vietnam there were never any losses below 450 meters. By the end of the first week of operation "Lamshon-719" the helicopter

count was down by 61, not counting helicopters receiving serious damage. Subsequently the losses climbed."

The next lesson taught by local wars is associated with joint use of combat helicopters and airplanes subordinated to an army command. Prior to the war in Vietnam representatives of the American ground forces demonstrated the suitability of including, within the composition of the ground troops, not only combat helicopters but also ground-attack aircraft. However, the army command was unable to either support or control warplanes through its own manpower and resources. American army aviation during the war in Vietnam was limited to just helicopters and light auxiliary airplanes. The air force provided immediate air support.

The problem of organizing a dependable system for controlling combat helicopters became acute during the war in Vietnam. "Absence of centralized control over large subunits of army aviation," stated the journal INTERAVIA, "was the reason for its low effectiveness as a troop fire support resource." The problem could not be solved by divisional combat control centers, which were supposed to coordinate ground and aerial fire on the basis of intelligence acquired by army airplanes. It was impossible to provide artillery and helicopter support at the same time due to the high probability of hitting friendly helicopters.

Lacking information, combat helicopter crews were often forced to acquire information on the objectives of their attacks on their own. But limited maneuverability and view made target search difficult, and combination of reconnaissance and fire support impossible. The solution was found in part in the tactics of combined forces. Reconnaissance and attack helicopters operated in the same combat formation and according to the same plan. A reconnaissance helicopter searched at will at minimum altitude. During this time two combat helicopters hovered at an altitude above 750 meters, out of the range of light weapons on the ground. On receiving target data from the scout by radio, they assumed a combat course and attacked the target. A simultaneous attack by two helicopters from different directions (separated by a minimum time interval) produced the best results. This forced small-caliber antiaircraft artillery to disperse its fire, and it reduced time over target. This tactic is presently being improved in exercises being conducted by NATO ground forces.

One of the main reasons for the relatively high vulnerability of helicopters to enemy ground fire was the short range of the weapons they carried. For accurate use of the available weapons, the pilot had to come so close to the object of attack that the helicopter found itself within the range of return fire. The impressive losses of American helicopters in Laos led to the idea of arming them with Tow antitank guided missiles having a range of 1.6-3 km.

The ambush tactic was found to be the most promising in the course of tests of the new weapon. Helicopters flew to areas near the traffic routes of enemy equipment, concealed themselves behind terrain obstacles at minimum altitude, and waited for the moment to strike. When a target entered into effective range of the weapon, the helicopter quickly gained altitude to permit the operator to lock onto the target, and then the missile was launched as the helicopter hovered above. After such an attack, another location was selected for an ambush.

One of the unique features of using the Tow antitank guided missile was the operator's need for controlling the missile until it reached the target. Guiding time was 10-20 seconds, which meant that a hovering helicopter could be hit by intense antiaircraft fire.

According to the journal TIME the USA lost 4,200 helicopters, including transporters, in 7 years of war in Indochina. (This is a ratio of one helicopter loss in every 1,000 sorties.) Despite the impressive losses the number of combat helicopters possessed by American ground troops grew constantly during the war and after it. "Considering our predictions of the nature of future warfare, both nuclear and conventional, we clearly see an acute need for increasingly larger numbers of helicopters of better quality," stated the journal AIR FORCE. "Today they are as inseparable a part of troop armament as are the tank, the armored transporter, the truck, and the jeep."

Western military experts came to the conclusion that the following tactics, learned from local wars, would be useful in a European theater of war: use of fire support helicopters in weather conditions restricting the actions of tactical aviation; ground reconnaissance (diversionary measures); tank suppression tactics.

According to reports of the Western press a typical support group seen in NATO exercises includesup to six or eight combat (attack) and three or four reconnaissance helicopters. The actions of such a group are divided into three phases: search and detection of the enemy; maneuvering and approach; attack. After receiving target data from the ground or from an aerial observer, the group commander, who is aboard a reconnaissance helicopter, covertly approaches the target for visual detection. On estimating the situation he makes his decision, which he radios to the rest of the crews. He indicates the distinguishing features of the target, the approach directions, an attack line based on ground reference points, the weapons to be employed, and the sequence of their use.

The overall combat formation is divided into two maneuverable groups, each of which is accompanied by a scout. Capitalizing on the terrain, they approach the fire position at minimum altitude with the intention of hitting the target from two sides. The commander monitors the situation and regulates traffic. After approaching to a range of 3-3.5 km the scouts are sent over the target first, marking it with smoke rockets. Two-stage control is practiced when two separate targets are to be struck simultaneously: The commander transmits his orders only to the crews of the reconnaissance helicopters, which themselves control their groups.

Another variant foresees the use of a diversionary group which strikes a secondary target and lays a smoke screen. At this moment the attack group (four helicopters) approaches covertly and makes a surprise attack on the main target. When the situation is favorable, the diversionary group hits the main target as well.

Also being concerned with battlefield reconnaissance and troop fire support, it is now the practice of the NATO command to commit the main efforts of combat helicopters to tank suppression. "The tactics of an antitank helicopter entail maintaining effective fire on a target from camouflaged positions affording protection," states the English journal FLIGHT. "This means that a helicopter must fly or hover at minimum altitude and operate both night and day. Comprehensive tests conducted by NATO showed that the loss ratio could be 1:10 in favor of helicopters in a

situation most favorable to the latter--that is, when swiftly charging tanks move over open terrain and the helicopters are concealed (in an ambush) a sufficient distance away from them."

It is believed that the new Hellfire antitank missiles may have a significant influence on tactics. Possessing a laser, a television, or a heat-seeking guidance system, they do not require tracking in the final leg of the trajectory (such a missile can be launched by the "set it and forget it" principle, permitting the helicopter to withdraw from the target area immediately after the guided missile is launched). It has now become possible to use antitank guided missiles at night. The maximum range of the Hellfire is 4,000 meters, which means that it can be launched outside the effective range of antiaircraft weapons covering tank combat formations.

And so, the principal combat helicopter tactics that were developed in local wars continue to be significant today. The principal elements include covertness of flight prior to gaining effective range, surprise, speed, and attack precision. Tactics are being adjusted as equipment and weapons improve. Use of a combined combat formation including combat and reconnaissance helicopters is said to be the most acceptable. The tank suppression tactics are based on the possibilities of antitank guided missiles and the accuracy of their guidance systems. Different variants of close interaction between army and air force tactical aviation on the battlefield are being developed and tested in exercises. The problems of helicopters in aerial combat are being studied. The search for new tactics goes on.

Western Antitank Weapons Viewed

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 30-31 signed to press 23 Oct 80

[Article by Col A. Kol'tsov based on foreign publications: "Modern Tank Suppression Resources and Tactics"]

[Text] The foreign military press has recently been devoting significant attention to development of the resources and tactics used to suppress tanks and other armored targets. This interest can be explained mainly by the continuing growth of the proportion of tanks in the armies of the principal countries of the world. Growth in the activity of the enemies of detente in the West, who are stirring heightened interest in armament and toward a fabricated "increasing threat" on the part of the Soviet Union and other countries, is also playing an important role.

Let us examine the basic directions in the development of antitank resources and the methods of their combat use in the armies of the NATO countries. They include various antitank guided missile complexes, gun tanks, gun-and-missile tanks, self-propelled and towed antitank guns, recoilless rifles, antitank grenade throwers, mines, and specially equipped armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, airplanes, and helicopters intended for tank suppression.

In the estimate of foreign military specialists various types of antitank guided missiles presently available and under development are the most promising antitank weapons of the ground troops. They are used both with portable or transportable launching devices, and with launchers installed on helicopters, armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, tanks, and motor vehicles.

The armies of the NATO countries are presently armed with second-generation antitank guided missiles having an effective range of guided flight from 65 to 4,000 meters and an armor piercing capability of up to 600 mm. They include the Tow, Dragon, Shilelah (USA), Swingfire (Great Britain), SS-11B1 Acra (France), and Hot and Milan (France, FRG).

An analysis of foreign materials would show that capitalist countries, and mainly the USA, FRG, and France, are making an intensive effort to create third-generation antitank guided missiles with supersonic speed, greater range, a capability for self-guidance to the target, higher interference resistance, and a capability for piercing laminated armor. Special attention has been turned in the design of the new generation of missiles to their mobility, and to the possibility for using them in all weather conditions, both day and night.

The effective range and guidance accuracy of a warhead can be raised by designing antitank guided missiles with laser homing warheads, as a result of which there is no need to track the missile throughout the entire trajectory of its flight to the target. Such missiles can be launched from ground shelters and helicopters; the latter could withdraw from the danger zone or find cover immediately after launching a missile.

The mobility of antitank guided missiles can be increased by creating new antitank combat helicopters and special tracked and wheeled cross-country vehicles. These special vehicles are outfitted with several telescopic and hinged missile launching rails, the necessary sighting devices, and an outfit of 30 or more missiles per vehicle.

These vehicles can fire on the move, and they can perform target search, and aim and fire their missiles, both day and night. Missile reloading is performed from within the vehicle as a rule. Such vehicles include the Striker (Great Britain) with five hinged launching rails, the M113A1 (USA) with telescopic rails, the AMX 10 (France) with four rails, the Marder (FRG) with two rails, and others.

The USA has begun production of 2,000 mobile M113A1 antitank guided missile systems, which will be supplied primarily to American units and formations deployed in West Europe. It has been reported that each motorized infantry battalion will receive 22 such systems.

In the estimate of NATO military experts, one of the most promising tank destroyers is the antitank combat helicopter, which does not require construction of special emplacements, and which is able to maneuver quickly toward approaching tanks, and seek and destroy moving armored targets in all meteorological conditions, both night and day, independently of the terrain features. It is believed that the role of helicopters in the antitank defense system will constantly grow, and that in the future they will become the principal tank suppression resource.

The experience of local wars shows that tanks themselves continue to be a powerful weapon against tanks; their potential for suppressing armored targets grew significantly in recent years. This was mainly due to their reequipment with new high-power rapid-fire smooth-bore stabilized guns employing improved ammunition, and

installation of the latest fire control systems, to include laser rangefinders, electronic ballistic computers, and night sights. As a consequence there is a high probability that new tanks can destroy their targets with the first shot at ranges up to 3,000 meters, and the time required for target search, aiming, and destruction has been minimized.

Antitank guns are also believed to be an effective means for suppressing armored targets. Their role has grown significantly owing to improvements in the fire control system and the consequent increase in firing accuracy at large range. The main emphasis in their subsequent development is being placed on creating self-propelled chassis for them. The FRG and the USA are using tracked armored transporters for these purposes, while Great Britain and France use wheeled armored vehicles. It is believed that creation of larger warheads equipped with laser homing systems and significant reduction of the time to prepare for firing and to fire such guns will increase the role of artillery even more.

Various sorts of single-use and reusable antitank grenade throwers with calibers from 60 to 90 mm and a range of up to 600 mm are the most broadly encountered antitank resources possessed by NATO infantry. The latest models are noiseless, and they do not give away the operator's position with smoke or flames when fired. Their subsequent improvement is following the lines of increasing range, installation of night sights, improving accuracy and armor piercing capability, and reducing weight and overall dimensions. The first models of multibarreled grenade throwers are appearing.

In the opinion of NATO military experts, more attention has been turned in recent years to traditional tank suppression resources such as antitank mines.

The present level of development of antitank resources in the NATO countries, which is typified by a sharp increase in their effectiveness, extensive introduction of these resources into the troops, and intensive development of new tactics in exercises are evidence of greater activity in the military preparations being made by this aggressive bloc.

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DOSAAF: AIR CLUBS

Flight Training Shortcomings Described

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Ye. Yelizarov, deputy chief, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Directorate of Air Training and Sports, and chief, Flight Safety Service: "In Exactingness, Begin With Yourself"]

[Text] Aviation would be unimaginable without rigid discipline, without strict observance of flying rules and flying laws. Their unfailing observance and fulfillment are the inviolable code of all who are entrusted with the piloting of airplanes, helicopters, and gliders. Flight safety and the success of flying depend on this. Thus it is no accident that the future pilot is persistently taught to respect "the laws of the sky" and to follow them strictly while still in school.

Let us begin with flight organization, with preflight preparation. It is said that success in the air is forged on the ground. And this is right: How you prepare is how you will fly. Flight quality depends on the quality of the preparations; it is independent of the pilot's experience or the proficiency he has attained. Most of our pilots strictly adhere to the requirements of preflight preparations, and they fly competently, without violations. But there are cases, there are deviations upon which we must dwell, and upon which we must focus our attention.

The training exercise is a tremendous support to preflight preparations; everyone knows this, and nevertheless the training exercise is often held formally, just for show. As a result mistakes are made in operation of the equipment, both on the ground and in the air; wrong, groundless actions are taken in evaluation of the evolved situation, and decisions are made incorrectly.

While flying within the zone with student R. Nugayev aboard a Mig-15 trainer, A. Krasnov, an instructor pilot of the Saransk Air Club, discovered a failure in radio communication. The flight was terminated without an attempt to determine the cause of the failure. On the ground, after the aircraft landed, it was revealed that the generator switch was in its "off" position.

A. Anikin, an instructor pilot of the Volgograd Air Club, did not look deeply enough into the preparations made by student Ye. Skorokhodov. He did not find out if his habits of working with the cockpit equipment were sound. As a result

the student made a mistake during a checkout flight aboard a two-seater. As they were taking off, at the moment the front wheel left the ground the student pressed the canopy release lever instead of the trimmer lever. Naturally the instructor was unable to prevent this, and the canopy was ejected. The flight ended safely only owing to the fact that the canopy did not damage the steering rudder.

In another case the crew noticed that the engine oil temperature began rising after take-off. On evaluating the situation, the pilot terminated the flight. It was discovered on the ground that a piece of paper had covered over the oil radiator. It may have done so while taxiing for take-off, or during take-off, or while the airplane was still parked. The truth could not be determined, and no one was blamed. But what this case does recall is that there is good reason for laying so much emphasis on the quality of the preparations made of an aircraft for flight, on its inspection by the crew prior to entering the cockpit, and on attentive inspection of the landing strip prior to flying and the general cleanliness of the parking pads, taxi-ways, and the entire operational area of the airfield. Commanders and chiefs are responsible for all of this. This particular case happened in Yoshkar-Ola, where G. Mazitov is the air club chief.

Air commanders in the defense society are highly educated people of high spiritual culture who know all the fine points of training and indoctrination. The broad outlook of their overwhelming majority is organically united with high self-discipline. And this is natural. This is the way it must be, since flight requirements are the same for all, no matter what positions they occupy: They must all learn to follow the laws of flying strictly and precisely. The slightest deviation means a violation of discipline, a lack of organization, placing all of the collective's efforts in the struggle for safe, accident-free flying in jeopardy.

Once during a checkout flight with a student, V. Malakhov, an instructor pilot of the Kemerovo Air Club, strayed 7 kilometers from the flight zone and, hoping to conceal his mistake, he dropped to an impermissibly low altitude. Violating flight discipline, the pilot grossly violated the safety requirements, creating a complex and perhaps hazardous situation for his crew.

Here is another example of poor discipline. Pilot-navigator I. Basistyy of the Kiev Air Club was to ferry an aircraft to a new airfield on a familiar route. He took off without accounting for the weather situation: strong headwinds with gusts of up to 18 meters per second.

I. Basistyy did not really prepare for the flight. Counting on his experience, he did not make his engineering and navigational computations, he did not operate the aircraft in such a way as to conserve fuel, and he did not monitor his fuel consumption. As a result, 3 hours later the pilot made a forced landing 15 kilometers from his airfield, having used up his fuel faster than usual.

But the crew commander's carelessness did not end there. In violation of the safety laws, he fueled the airplane with motor vehicle gasoline, took off, and then landed at his own airfield. It was only an accident that the flight ended safely.

Why is that senior crewmembers, commanders, and instructors--people having the function of training and indoctrination, mainly according to the "Do as I do" principle--are not always good examples in preflight preparations, in the ability to operate equipment, in observance of flight discipline?

There are many reasons, but the main ones are inexactingness toward oneself, and an irresponsible attitude toward one's official responsibilities. Consequently development of exactingness toward oneself, development of a sense of responsibility for assigned work is one of the main directions in the work of executives, political workers, and the party and Komsomol organizations of the air clubs.

It would be impossible to raise exactingness without maintaining daily surveillance--an effective resource for fighting against irresponsibility, carelessness, and lack of discipline. Surveillance must be all-embracing, and it must be constant. It is very important for this surveillance to be readily apparent to the personnel. It creates a situation of intolerance of shortcomings, and of violations of discipline and law.

Exactingness means not only intolerance of the shortcomings of others, but self-criticism as well. Criticism and self-criticism are the most effective tested means for developing a spirit of exactingness toward oneself and others within the collective. Criticism and self-criticism raise the responsibility of each individual for the assigned work, they develop intolerance of all sorts of violations, and they permit deeper analysis of one's own shortcomings and mistakes in work, and discovery of ways to correct them.

Experience shows that wherever training and indoctrination proceed in accordance with the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress, wherever the administration and political workers direct their main efforts at raising the sense of responsibility of the airmen for their official duties, the results of the work and of preflight preparations are always high. This is precisely how things are in the Kinel'-Cherkassy, Kemerovo, and Moscow air clubs. Naturally these clubs have their difficulties as well. But when shortcomings are revealed, they do not limit themselves to simply documenting the violations; instead, they seek their causes, they plan ways to eliminate them as quickly as possible, and they demand precise and prompt execution. Important significance is attached to the visuality of surveillance.

Here is an indicative example. A violation by V. Malakhov, an instructor pilot of the Kemerovo Air Club, who grossly violated flying discipline, did not pass into oblivion. Owing to the exactingness of flight leader G. Shabalin and his strict adherence to principles, the pilot's violation was promptly revealed by means of objective control materials, and it was analyzed by the collective. The violator of the flying laws was severely punished, and the violation was reported to the next level of command.

But things are different at the Vyaz'ma, Saransk, Kaluga, and Maykop air clubs and the Central Sport Gliding Club. Exactingness is chronically low here in flight organization and management, in flight training methods, and in the quality of preflight preparations. The role of the flight commander and the instructor pilot--the most important people in the training and indoctrination of airmen--is

understated. For this reason some flight commanders avoid training and indoctrination, transforming themselves into taxi-drivers, ferrying aircraft to the repair bases and back, or into permanent acting instructor pilots, or into managers and organizers of various sorts of housekeeping tasks. All of this has an extremely negative effect upon surveillance over the quality of flight crew preflight preparations, and over compliance with the correct sequence of instructor pilot and student training, and flight planning and performance.

Acquisition of higher proficiency classes by flying personnel and ground crews is a most important lever by which to raise flying and teaching proficiency, to insure flight safety, and to maintain high exactingness toward oneself. The executives and the party and Komsomol organizations of the best air training organizations (in Zaporozh'ye, Yegor'yevsk, Sumy) devote constant and unweakening attention to this problem. Here the pilots do not simply "log the hours" necessary for promotion to the next higher class; instead, they systematically improve their theoretical knowledge, their teaching skills, and their flying proficiency.

Unfortunately the work is not organized this well everywhere. Thus some pilots who reach the top class settle back, satisfied with their achievements, they weaken their exactingness toward themselves, and they do not make any special effort to prepare for their instructor and solo flights. As a result when finding themselves in a complex situation, they lose control and make mistakes.

A good commander flies boldly, he flies a lot, and he manages people thoughtfully; at the same time he is uncompromisingly exacting toward everything having to do with the flight regulations. This is in terms of both himself and other people. But mainly himself. No one can reproach him for being weak-willed. And remember, there is a direct line from self-discipline to the discipline of subordinates. When a good commander makes his preflight preparations, everyone knows that they will be done right. His actions in flight simulators are always strictly in accordance with the instructions. His subordinates work and rest strictly according to the schedule. The commander's strict adherence to the rules helps him nurture exactingness in his pilots. It is no accident that flying proceeds well in such a collective.

Do we have such commander and chiefs? Yes, we do. They include G. Krutilin, chief of the Volchansk Pilot School; G. Oleynichenko, chief of the Kinel'-Cherkassy Air Club; V. Orlov, chief of the Zaporozh'ye Air Club; V. Afinogenov, chief of the Kursk Air Club; V. Monin, chief of the Volgograd Air Club; V. Khaustov and V. Kraynov, squandron commanders of the Zaporozh'ye Air Club; V. Murzin, squadron commander of the Sumy Air Club; N. Mikhal'skiy, squadron commander of the Vladimir Air Club.

Flying laws have been around for a long time, but they do not march in place; instead, they constantly undergo improvement and updating, and they get more and more complex. This is the will of the times. Airmen work with reliable craft outfitted with smart instruments and mechanisms, but flying itself has not become easier or simpler as a result. As the potentials of the equipment have improved, the flying rules have become stricter. Compliance with them is an immutable law.

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Awards and Criticisms of Air Clubs

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 2, Feb 80 pp 4-5

[Text] The Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Aviation Workers summarized the results of the all-union socialist competition of USSR DOSAAF aviation organizations in 1979.

The joint resolution notes that by fulfilling the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and of the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination", and the requirements of the Eighth All-Union DOSAAF Congress, the collectives of the USSR DOSAAF aviation organizations achieved higher indicators in fulfillment of the assignments planned for the 1978-1979 training year, and in the socialist pledges to train air sportsmen and air specialists for the USSR Armed Forces.

The level of political indoctrination has risen in the aviation organizations of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian SSR, and in a number of oblasts of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Kemerovskaya, Ryazanskaya, Bryanskaya, Tul'skaya). This has promoted further improvement in training and indoctrination, improvement of the training material base, and reinforcement of discipline and organization.

The perpetual red banners of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Aviation Workers, diplomas, and cash first prizes have been awarded to the following for successful fulfillment of flight training plans and satisfaction of socialist pledges to train air specialists and sportsmen:

Volchansk DOSAAF Aviation Pilot School (chief, G. Krutilin; local committee chairman, G. Ukrainets);

Zaporozh'ye Jet Air Club (chief, V. Orlov; local committee chairman, V. Sidorchuk);

Sumy Helicopter Air Club (chief, I. Titarenko; local committee chairman, V. Garin);

USSR Central Air Club imeni V. P. Chkalov (chief, Yu. Komitsyn; local committee chairman F. Matyuk);

Kaunas Aviation-Sports Club (chief, A. Ionushas; local committee chairman, M. Karklyus).

Second place winners were:

Ryazan' Jet Air Club (chief, V. Boykov; local committee chairman, K. Basin);

Volgograd Jet Air Club (chief, V. Monin; local committee chairman, A. Ostapenko);

Kemerovo Helicopter Air Club (chief, V. Stolyarov; local committee chairman, V. Sychev);

Moscow City Air Club No 1 (chief, N. Yefremtsev; local committee chairman A. Chernykh);

Bryansk Aviation-Sports Club (chief, V. Gorbachev; local committee chairman, B. Porkunov).

These collectives were awarded certificates and cash second prizes.

The third place winners were:

Kaluga DOSAAF Aviation-Technical School (chief, V. Nikishin; local committee chairman, Ye. Popov);

Lipetsk Jet Air Club (chief, V. Antipov; local committee chairman, Ye. Platon[illegible]);

Atkarsk Helicopter Air Club (chief, A. Karakotin; local committee chairman, L. Pomin);

Minsk Air Club (chief, V. Kovalev; local committee chairman, A. Doroshkevich);

Tula Aviation-Sports Club (chief, V. Yermolayev; local committee chairman, I. Yemel'yanov).

These sports-training organizations were awarded certificates and cash third prizes.

The Kinel'-Cherkassy Air Club was nominated to receive, for best specialist training, the Air Force Challenge Red Banner, while the Kolomna Aviation-Sports Club was nominated to receive the Challenge Red Banner of the Airborne Troops.

The Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Aviation Workers made mention of the good work done by the Ul'yanov, Chelyabinsk, Kursk, Kuybyshev, Bogodukhov, Vladimir, Rostov, Novosibirsk, Central Glider, Leningrad, Riga, and Alma-Ata air clubs, the Serpukhov, Yessentuki, Sverdlovsk, Rovno, and Vinnitsa aviation-sports clubs, and the Panevezhis DOSAAF aviation-technical club. Concurrently the attention of Kirgiz SSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman K. Usenbekov and the chairmen of the DOSAAF oblast committees of the Moldavian ASSR (V. Bokhlev), the Udmurt ASSR (N. Baranov), and Kaluzhskaya (I. Kozlov), Smolenskaya (A. Voytseshuk), Yaroslavskaya (V. Zhukov), and Chernigovskaya (Ye. Khodzevich) oblasts was turned to serious shortcomings in organizational work, training, and indoctrination in sports-training organizations.

The joint resolution obligates the DOSAAF committees, the committees of the Trade Union of Aviation Workers, and executives of the DOSAAF aviation organizations to upgrade the quality and effectiveness of organizational work and political indoctrination in the 1980 school year, in an effort to fulfill the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination". The main efforts are to be directed at improving flight training, insuring flight safety and the safety of parachute jumps, reinforcing discipline, improving the organization of socialist competition, and insuring an honorable welcome for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, and successful completion of the year 1980.

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NAVAL FORCES: AIR-SEA RESCUE TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 80 p 6

[Article by Capt Lt V. Sadovskiy, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "Over the Sea--We Serve the Soviet Union"]

[Text] A man lay on the water, his arms spread out. He had either lost consciousness or used up his strength and was unable to attach the cable. The helicopter hovered several seconds above the waves, then made a turn and began descending--for a landing. Inflatable silvery floats, or air bags, slapped the sides of the helicopter lightly as they inflated. "Dangerous altitude, dangerous altitude...," came the warning through the headsets from an automatic device. The air from the propeller whipped up the already turbulent water, turning it into spray. A wave softly rocked the helicopter. The airborne technician reported: "I see a man off to the left"....

Flying is flying, but still it is more disturbing to fly over water than over land. In all directions one sees only an enormous expanse of water. This is a common sight to Naval Aviation flyers. Helicopter personnel fly perhaps more frequently than any of the others. Even during the long polar night the rotary-winged aircraft take off daily from airfields, helicopter pads and ship decks.

...It was not yet dawn when the commander of the helicopter regiment took the group of helicopters out to sea on an assignment. He then dispatched a crew to land personnel and food at a remote site. Another helicopter flew off to pick up a sick man, yet another flew off to haul a high-voltage pylon to a group of construction workers. A special crew, the duty rescue crew, awaited its time in a shack at the edge of the airfield.

And now its time had come. Today's flight was actually listed as a training flight, but the situation at sea was far from artificial.

It was past noon when the "disaster" message was received in the regiment. The commander and I rushed to the shack at the edge of the airfield. Through the open door I could see a small room with the appearance of a living room. One of the airmen marched to the fore and reported to the regimental commander. We were hastily introduced. This was Captain Stepanov, helicopter commander. The chess game and the books were immediately forgotten. The crew rapidly donned naval rescue suits (MSK). These are orange-colored, air-tight suits, which hold in the heat like a thermos.

The helicopter was parked next to the shack. Outwardly it looked like an ordinary helicopter, only the door of the cargo compartment was somewhat wider and along the rounded sides one could see the blue waterline. This helicopter could also float.

I ran after the rescue workers to the helicopter. Captain Gennadiy Stepanov in the pilot's seat on the left was hurriedly fastening his parachute. On his right Senior Lieutenant Valeriy Nefedov, pilot-navigator was already clicking tumbler switches. Airborne technician Viktor Ivanovich Korzhemanov, lean and strong and the oldest of the crew members, sat down on a folding seat between them. Warrant Officer Valeriy Sgadov, the medic, and I remained in the cargo compartment.

The helicopter began to tremble softly. I bent over the intercom device and heard Stepanov's voice in the earphones:

"Technician, run through the chart"!

The chart is a list of things to be checked prior to takeoff. "Covers removed?" the technician read. Stepanov leaned to the left and looked: "Covers removed." There were about 20 questions and answers. It is the rule that everything has to be rechecked prior to takeoff. It was rather hot in the naval rescue suit and I followed the crew's example in hooking up to the air hose. The air surging through the suit cooled the skin pleasantly.

The surface of the sea appeared as glass lined with cracks made by the waves. There were no markers below and one had the feeling of hovering in place over the water. We maintained our course by the arrow on the radio compass, which was tuned to the emergency station wavelength. As long as the disaster signal was being transmitted the arrow would indicate the proper direction to the pilot.

There is a game called "Hot-And-Cold." What was occurring was something like that game. When the helicopter turned off the course the squeaking of the alarm was barely audible in the earphones. When it returned to the course the radio signal would become louder, or "hot".... The small transmitter, as large as the palm of a hand, toward the voice of which the helicopter was flying, is a part of the emergency kit for seamen and naval pilots. The kit also contains an inflatable boat, a package of food, medicines, signal flares, a light, a special powdered dye which makes a spot on the water visible from a high altitude, and fishing gear. It is possible to survive on the water with these items. The main thing is not to become dispirited, not to lose hope.

"We are passing over the target!" Stepanov said.

The helicopter banked sharply and began turning. In the cargo compartment the medic grabbed the medicine chest as it jumped into the air. I was pressed against the side. Through the porthole I could see a man lying on top of the water. After this we descended for the landing which I described at the beginning, and the airborne technician reported that he saw a man off to the left.

The men hauled the "victim" out of the sea with their hands. Stepanov abruptly increased the propeller pitch, "gave it the gas," and the helicopter began rising steeply. The assignment now called for us to find a boat. Once again we were flying toward an intermittent disaster signal. It was coming from a long way off....

The weather was relatively good that day. This is not always the case, however. During that same temporary detachment on duty I met military pilot A. A. Kraynov, a veteran of the Polar Region and holder of the Order of the Red Banner. One time a storm was violently buffeting a stalled vessel near the ship on which Kraynov's helicopter was based. It was impossible to approach the vessel by sea without being slammed into it by the waves.

"The entire crew assessed our chances and decided that we could reach the vessel by air," Kraynov recalls. "The sailors rolled the helicopter out of the hangar by hand. The water was knee-deep on the deck, flowing in waves. To prevent the helicopter from being overturned we attached it with cables, giving them some slack. The plan was to start the engines, build up rpm's and then release the ropes. And this is how we took off...."

For several days Kraynov's helicopter made shuttle flights over the stormy sea, dropping food and medicine and bringing up people--dozens of hazardous, masterful takeoffs and landings on the unsteady postage stamp of a deck.

This was a training flight, but it was still not an easy one for Stepanov and his crew. They would have to search an enormous area to find a boat "in trouble" and to "rescue" a man, hauling him up into the helicopter.

Finally, the second objective for this flight was detected. A click of a toggle switch lighted up a small television screen. A camera installed in the tail section of the helicopter was focused directly beneath us, on the boat in distress.

"Prepare to begin working!" Stepanov gave the command.

Airborne technician Korzhemanov attached the safety line--several meters of fine steel cable--and plugged his headset into the intercom system again. There are jacks at various spots in the compartment, and the crew members maintain constant contact with each other.

Now the door was slid open and the blustery wind burst into the compartment. The helicopter rocked perceptibly. Korzhemanov moved the crane gib outside the helicopter and went to the opening.

"Two to the left," he gave the adjustment to the pilot over the intercom. "We are hovering well."

A stiff wind was blowing. It tossed and shook the multiton helicopter like a blade of grass. Stepanov traced intricate, complex patterns with the control stick. Only his hands and his eyes moved. He performed smoothly. The tension was hidden inside him. The helicopter hovered over the boat once more. The crane

cable descended. "You've got it fastened.... Nice work. Now we can bring you up...." All the voices sounded alike in the earphones, and I could only tell from the movement of Korzhemanov's lips that it was he who was speaking. He spoke softly, in his everyday manner, like a surgeon during an operation.

The airborne technician leaned out of the compartment and grabbed the cable to try to lessen the gigantic swinging motion extending the length of a five-story building. The helicopter shook and the cable swung back and forth, and between them was a man reducing the force of the blows. Korzhemanov hung over the sea in this manner until the "victim" was lifted on board....

"There is the shore!" Stepanov said a quarter of an hour later. I did not immediately notice the dark line of the land becoming outlined against the horizon. We then saw the lights on the shore, a settlement lying between the hills, and the airfield on the edge of which stood the small shack of the duty rescue crew, always awake.

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